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I. INTRODUCTION
A. The Rise and Fall of the Telecom Industry
In the last decade, the telecommunications industry has experienced
significant growth and consolidation in response to such external factors as
deregulation and liberalization, technological change, and global market
forces.' In addition, industry consolidation has occurred to achieve greater
economies of scale and scope through more efficient deployment of
network infrastructure.
Moreover, the desire of large, multinational customers to obtain fully
integrated, end-to-end global telecommunications services from a single
source (a "one-stop" telecom shopping experience, if you will) has created
the impetus for telecom firms to offer multiservice broadband and seamless
worldwide telecommunications networks. However, a major barrier to
achieving this goal is the significant capital required to construct and
1. Between 1996 and 2001, more than twenty M&A transactions worth over $20
billion took place in the telecom sector, including the two largest deals, the $180 billion
hostile bid successfully launched by Vodafone in November 1999 to acquire the
Mannesmann conglomerate and build the largest mobile provider across Europe, and the
$160 billion merger between AOL and Time Warner. See Gilles Le Blanc & Howard
Shelanski, Merger Control and Remedies Policy in Telecommunications Mergers in the
E.U. and U.S. 9 (Aug. 2002) (preliminary draft) at http://intel.si.umich.edu/tprc/papers/
2002/122/TPRCTelecomMergers.pdf.
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deploy a global network and to develop innovations necessary to provide
advanced services. In order to overcome this barrier, telecom companies
typically adopt cooperative approaches to network building-such as
mergers and acquisitions, joint ventures, legal partnerships, and strategic
alliances (collectively referred to as "M&A")-that combine
complementary skills, technologies, and geographic reach, and achieve
greater economies of scale and scope. As a telecom company expands its
network and customer reach, its attractiveness as a potential global partner
is also enhanced. A broader capacity and customer reach creates internal
efficiencies that can result in lower costs for subscribers.
The telecom industry consisted traditionally of legally mandated
monopolies that were regulated by governmental authorities. Technological
advances, including the development of alternative infrastructures and new
services, have dramatically altered the economics of telecom services and
have made possible the potential for competition to replace regulation in at
least part of the services provided. The deregulation of the industry during
the last decade has allowed telecom firms to achieve economies of scale
and scope by (1) expanding into new product or geographic markets or
gaining market entry across traditional industry lines and (2) integrating
network infrastructure and content. In a deregulated environment, telecom
firms may seek to provide a "bundle" of products and services, particularly
with the technological convergence of the telecom and cable industries.
New technologies also stimulate M&A activity. For example, the
provision of broadband access services in the homes of consumers and the
ability to combine content with transmission were key factors behind many
telecommunications mergers. Further, the erosion of trade restrictions and
other international regulatory barriers facilitated increased cross-border
telecommunications activity as well as the number of mergers and joint
ventures among international firms.
While rapid growth contributed to industry consolidation during the
last decade, the recent downturn in the telecom industry may also result in
further industry consolidation during the next several years. For example,
in anticipation of a huge global demand for high-speed broadband
transmission capacity, network owners and operators invested considerable
capital in global fiber-optic networks only to discover that actual demand
levels remained a fraction of built capacity. As a result, a glut of
transmission capacity exists globally, leaving network owners and
operators struggling to "fill their pipes." These network assets are now
prime for acquisition by the larger and more stable carriers seeking to
expand their networks. Further, while deregulation efforts in the North
American telecommunications industry were aimed at promoting and
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facilitating competition in all areas, the state of real competition in some
sectors remains questionable with many participants, including long-
distance providers, competitive local exchange carriers ("CLECs"), and
wireless providers, experiencing financial difficulties.2 Again, the network
assets of these companies may be seen as attractive to those companies
seeking to expand their geographic reach or service offerings.
Finally, in Canada, the anticipated removal or relaxation of the
foreign ownership restrictions relating to facilities-based telecom carriers
and broadcasting distribution undertakings will provide further
opportunities for international consolidation.3
2. Appendix B provides a partial list of telecommunications companies that have
experienced economic difficulties in the past few years.
3. On April 28, 2003, following a month-long public hearing, the House of Commons
Industry, Science, and Technology Committee issued its report entitled "Opening Canadian
Communications to the World," (the "Industry Report") in which the Committee
recommended that the Government of Canada prepare all necessary legislative changes to
entirely remove the existing minimum Canadian ownership requirements applicable to
telecommunications common carriers set out in the Canadian Telecommunications Act. In
addition, the Committee recommended that the same changes be made to the foreign
ownership restrictions applicable to broadcasting distribution undertakings ("BDUs"),
which include cable companies and DTH (or DBS) satellite companies. STANDING COMM.
ON INDUS., SC., AND TECH., HOUSE OF COMMONS, OPENING CANADIAN COMMUNICATIONS TO
THE WORLD (April 2003), available at http://www.parl.gc.ca/InfoComDoc/37/2/INST/
Studies/Reports/instrp03/instrp03-e.pdf.
However, in a separate report prepared by the Standing Committee on Canadian
Heritage entitled Our Cultural Sovereignty: The Second Century of Canadian Broadcasting
(the "Heritage Report"), issued on June 11, 2003, that Committee recommended that the
foreign ownership restrictions for all broadcasting entities, including BDUs, remain in place.
STANDING COMM. ON CANADIAN HERITAGE, HOUSE OF COMMONS, OUR CULTURAL
SOVEREIGNTY: THE SECOND CENTURY OF CANADIAN BROADCASTING 420-23 ( June 11,
2003), available at http:llwww.parl.gc.calInfocomDoclbak/37/2/HERI/StudieslReports/
herirp02/herirp02-e.pdf.
On September 25, 2003, the Minister of Industry, Allan Rock, tabled in the House
of Commons the Canadian Government's response to recommendations of the Industry
Report. In its response, the Government acknowledged that (1) removing the Canadian
ownership requirements would benefit the telecommunications industry, and (2) it would be
irresponsible not to pursue the symmetrical removal of similar restrictions in respect of
BDUs at the same time. However the Government noted that the Heritage Report had
expressed contrary views on the removal of the Canadian ownership requirements.
Accordingly, in order to reconcile these two conflicting policy recommendations, the
Government undertook the immediate launch of an analysis on this issue, so that by the
spring of 2004, it would be in a position to examine possible solutions. Press Release,
Industry Canada, Government Responds to Industry Committee's Recommendations on
Foreign Investment Restrictions in Telecommunications (Sept. 25 2003), available at
http://www.ic.gc.ca/cmb/welcomeic.nsf/261 ce500dfcd7259852564820068dc6d/85256a5d00
6b972085256dac00616a22 !OpenDocument.
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B. The Evolution of Efficiency Analysis
The focus of competition policy on the promotion of efficiency has
not always been clearly understood and remains controversial. Historically,
U.S. competition authorities and U.S. courts were hostile to M&A that
significantly increased market share concentration, regardless of whether
they produced efficiencies. Today, there remains under U.S. antitrust laws
a cautious hesitancy toward permitting efficiencies to trump concentration
concerns in all but close cases. Moreover, telecom M&A activity involving
U.S. operations adds an additional layer of complexity in that most telecom
transactions are also subject to approval by the U.S. Federal
Communications Commission ("FCC"), which applies a broad public
interest standard that gives due consideration to efficiencies benefits when
determining whether, on balance, the transaction is in the public interest.
Although the European Union appears to have recognized the
advances made in economic and financial theory during the latter half of
the twentieth century in drafting the European Community Merger
Regulation ("ECMR"),4 to date, efficiencies have been more of a detriment
than a benefit to merging entities. In contrast, not only has the Canadian
Government adopted legislation that expressly authorizes the consideration
of efficiencies, but the courts in Canada have also applied the legislation so
as to permit full consideration of efficiencies. As the marketplace continues
to evolve globally, convergence among the major enforcement authorities
on fundamental competition principles, such as the role of efficiencies, will
be critical.
It is not surprising that the treatment of efficiencies remains
controversial, if not confused. There exist several difficult and
determinative factors and policies surrounding the implementation of
efficiencies, including: (1) what type of efficiencies should count, (2) what
welfare standard should be applied, (3) what standard of proof should be
imposed, and (4) how efficiencies should be factored into the analysis. As
discussed later in this paper, there are neither easy nor consistent answers.
This paper is divided into four parts. In the first part, we explore some
of the efficiencies-based motivations and rationales for telecom M&A. In
the second part, we review the procedures and regulatory authorities
responsible for telecom merger review in the United States, Europe, and
Canada. In the third part, we examine the treatment of efficiencies in the
4. Council Regulation 4064/89 on the Control of Concentrations Between
Undertakings, 1989 O.J. (L 395) 1, amended by Council Regulation 1310/97, 1997 O.J. (L
180) 1.
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context of merger review in the three jurisdictions. Finally, we discuss
some of the outstanding policy issues relating to the treatment of
efficiencies.
II. EFFICIENCIES AND THE RATIONALE FOR TELECOM MERGERS
A. Introduction
Traditional "production-based" theories posit that the primary
motivations for mergers are the acquisition of market power and the
achievement of economies of scale. In combining resources and customers,
firms hope to create market power by eliminating actual competition or
potential competition. In addition, because many television firms are still
subject to substantial economic regulatory oversight, some mergers are
undertaken to enable a firm to avoid effective regulation or facilitate the
company in leveraging its existing monopoly power in the regulated market
into another unregulated market.'
Ignoring goals of market power, which of course do not sit well with
competition authorities, M&A in the telecom sector can allow firms to
increase geographic reach or expand small-scale operations into large-scale
ones. Following the completion of a merger, some firms find that they can
offer a less expensive, more efficient, and broader range of services to
consumers through joint production, while others can leverage their
existing networks for better capacity utilization. In particular, operating
efficiencies may result from combined networks through reduced leased-
line costs, the avoidance of expensive termination charges internationally
and domestically, the combination of infrastructure assets, and the sale or
redeployment of redundant assets.
B. Production-Based Theory and Economies of Scale and Scope
In general, whenever a merger expands a network, cost savings
associated with production efficiencies may result through conventional
economies of scale and, to a lesser degree, economies of scope and density.
As firms seek to achieve optimal scale, inefficiently scaled firms will be
driven from the market by exit or acquisition. Merging the operations of
two firms may reduce duplication, allow fixed expenditures to be spread
across a larger base of output, and permit firms to reorganize services
across their combined networks.
5. See Jerry Ellig, Telecommunications Mergers and Theories of the Firm, in
ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND THE FIRM: AUSTRIAN PERSPECTIVES ON ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION
193, 194 (Nicolai J. Foss & Peter G. Klein eds., 2002).
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Production efficiencies include savings that flow from specialization,
elimination of duplication, reduced downtime, smaller base of spare parts,
smaller inventory requirements, and avoidance of capital expenditures that
would otherwise have been required. Further savings can arise from the
rationalization of research and development ("R&D") activities and various
administrative and management functions (e.g., sales, marketing,
accounting, purchasing, finance, and production). In addition, M&A can
bring about efficiencies in relation to distribution, advertising, and capital
raising. 6
Companies also can increase productive efficiency through
economies of scope. Such savings result from the cost savings of providing
two products or services together rather than separately. Potential sources
of scope savings include common raw inputs, complementary technical
knowledge, and reduction in or elimination of distribution channels and
sales forces.
In the context of telecommunications networks, economies of scale
can be significant due to the considerable investment in network
infrastructure (e.g., fiber-optic cable, submarine cables, and cellular towers)
and related operational software. In these cases, the associated technology
platform can be used to produce additional output with minimal increases
in variable costs (up to the point of maximum capacity). A sample
collection of examples of economies of scale and scope that can be
achieved in telecom M&A is provided below. It must be recognized that
many of the cost savings described in these M&A have been analyzed
through the eyes of the FCC, which reviews telecom transactions in the
context of the "public interest."7
6. See Fabienne Ilzkovitz & Roderick Meiklejohn, European Merger Control: Do We
Need an Efficiency Defence?, 5 EUR. EcON. 4 (2001), available at
http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy-finance/publications/european-economy/2001/eersO5O
len.pdf.
7. However, economies of density may not be as significant because network traffic is
normally collected and routed in a decentralized fashion such that routing
telecommunications traffic through densely populated portions of the network may be less
than optimal. Richard Schwindt & Steven Globerman, Evaluating the Efficiency
Consequences of Mergers in Network Industries: Complications and Concerns, in PAPERS
OF THE CANADIAN BAR ASSOCIATION ANNUAL FALL CONFERENCE ON COMPETITION LAW-
1999 at 299 (Glenn F. Leslie ed., 1999).
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1. More Intensive Use of Physical and Intellectual Property
In the AT&T/TCI transaction,8 the parties claimed that additional
traffic could be routed over existing switches and transport facilities,
allowing fixed costs to be spread across more lines and services. 9
In the SBC/Ameritech merger, 10 the parties submitted that product
development and testing costs could be spread over a larger number of
access lines, and $54 million could be saved annually by reducing office
space.1 The parties also projected cost savings of $313 million from
combining their respective provisioning and maintenance, switching
operations and network engineering, and other miscellaneous categories of
savings. 2
2. More Efficient Deployment of Radio Spectrum
In the Nextel/Motorola transaction, 13 the FCC noted that by
integrating Motorola's 900 MHz service into Nextel's 800 MHz spectrum,
Nextel would "be in a position to make the highest valued use of the
spectrum." 14
8. On June 24, 1998, AT&T Corporation and Tele-Communications, Inc. announced
they intended to merge, with AT&T becoming the parent company of TCI in an all-stock
transaction valued at approximately $48 billion. ("AT&T/TCI"). Press Release, AT&T,
AT&T, TCI to Merge, Create New AT&T Consumer Services Unit (June 24, 1998),
available at http://www.att.com/news/0698/980624.cha.html.
9. Ellig, supra note 5, at 209; see also Applications of Teleport Comm. Group Inc. and
AT&T Corp., Memorandum Opinion and Order, 13 F.C.C.R. 15236, para. 34, 12 Comm.
Reg. (P & F) 1095 (1998) [hereinafter AT&T/TCI Order].
10. On May 11, 1998, SBC and Ameritech announced their intention to merge in a $62
billion deal, with the combined company being called SBC and the company being owned
by approximately fifty-six percent of SBC's existing shareholders and forty-four of
Ameritech's existing shareholders ("SBC/Ameritech"). See Seth Schiesel, $62 Billion Deal
to Shift Balance in Phone Industry, N.Y. TIMES, May 12, 1998, at Al; Press Release, SBC,
SBC Communications and Ameritech to Merge (May 11, 1998), available at
http://www.sbc.com/press_room/l ,,31,00.htmlquery=2625.
11. Ellig, supra note 5, at 209; see also Applications of Ameritech Corp. and SBC
Comm. Inc., Memorandum Opinion and Order, 14 F.C.C.R. 14712, para. 339, 18 Comm.
Reg. (P & F) 1 (1999) [hereinafter SBC/Ameritech Order].
12. SBC/Ameritech Order, supra note 11, para. 325.
13. "On September 25, 2000 .... Motorola and Nextel filed applications seeking [FCC]
consent for Motorola to assign [fifty-nine] 900 MHz SMR licenses to Nextel." Applications
of Motorola, Inc. and FCI 900, Inc., Memorandum Opinion and Order, 16 F.C.C.R. 8451,
para. 2 (2001) (footnotes omitted).
14. Id. para. 36.
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In the Nextel/Pacific Wireless transaction, 5 the FCC agreed that the
more efficient use of spectrum, the additional services that would be
provided to current customers, and Nextel's increased ability to compete in
the commercial mobile radio services ("CMRS") marketplace, all
constituted merger-specific public interest benefits. 16
3. Systems Economies
A merged firm needs to retain only one "system" to manage its
combined facilities and operations. In SBC/PacTel, 7 the FCC agreed that
the transactions would allow the merged entity to provide lower-cost, long-
distance service through the combination of software development,
customer service, billing, and collection.1 8 In SBC/Ameritech, the parties
claimed cost savings from combining their administrative functions,
Yellow Pages, wireless service, and Internet service business activities.' 9 In
the Bell Atlantic/GTE transaction,2 ° the FCC stated that the transaction
"should also produce system-wide efficiencies through common network
engineering, management, purchasing, and administrative functions,
lending to earlier and broader deployment of advanced wireless services."-2'
As these examples illustrate, the elimination of redundant systems or
consolidation of systems can result in significant savings.
15. "On July 27, 2001 . . . Pacific Wireless Technologies and Nextel filed an
application seeking [FCC] consent for Pacific Wireless to assign [one hundred eighty-eight]
800 MHz SMR licenses to Nextel." Applications of Pac. Wireless Techs., Inc. and Nextel of
Cal., Inc., Memorandum Opinion and Order, 16 F.C.C.R. 20341, para. 2 (2001) (footnotes
omitted).
16. Id. para. 18.
17. On April 1, 1996, SBC and Pacific Telesis Group agreed to merge in a deal with a
reported value of between $16.7 billion and $24 billion ("SBC/PacTeI"). See Mark Landler,
Two Bell Companies Agree to Merger Worth $17 Billion, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 2, 1996, at Al.
18. See Applications of Pac. Telesis Group, and SBC Comm. Inc., Memorandum
Opinion and Order, 12 F.C.C.R. 2624, para. 74, 6 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 137 (1997)
[hereinafter SBC/PacTel Order].
19. SBC/Ameritech Order, supra note 11, para. 325.
20. On July 28, 1998, Bell Atlantic announced that it intended to buy GTE for $52.8
billion in stock. ("Bell Atlantic/GTE"). See Seth Schiesel & Laura M. Holson, Two Phone
Giants Reported Merging in $52 Billion Deal, N.Y. TIMES, July 28, 1998, at Al.
21. Application of GTE Corp. and Bell Atlantic Corp., Memorandum Opinion and
Order, 15 F.C.C.R. 14032, para. 377, 20 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 989 (2000) [hereinafter Bell
Atlantic/GTE Order].
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4. Advertising and Customer Acquisition
In Bell Atlantic/GTE, the parties argued that greater scale and
advertising or marketing synergies would allow the merged entity to
achieve efficiencies needed to develop a national brand.2" Further, the
acquisition of GTE's customers would provide Bell Atlantic with instant
access to customers outside of its territory.2 3
In AT&T/TCI, the parties expected to achieve lower costs of
customer acquisition by cross-selling services (selling AT&T's long
distance to TCI's cable subscribers) and by using existing sales forces.24
The FCC stated:
By combining AT&T's strong brand name and substantial base of
residential, long distance customers with [TCI's] substantial local
facilities and expertise and knowledge in providing local services, the
merged entity should be better situated than either AT&T or [TCI]
individually to compete more quickly for residential customers in
multiple dwelling units in high density markets in the short run, and for
broader groups of residential customers in the longer run.
25
In SBC/PacTel, the FCC recognized that "by increasing
SBC/PacTel's customer base, [the proposed transaction] may also make
feasible the development of new products and services that need a large
customer base in order to be economically viable."
26
In the MCI/WorldCom merger,27 the parties claimed that "[b]y
linking WorldCom's local facilities to MCI's long distance customer base,
the combined company will substantially enhance its effectiveness in
competing with the incumbent local exchange carriers."
28
22. See Bell Atlantic/GTE Order.
23. See id., para. 225.
24. See Ellig, supra note 5, at 209-10.
25. AT&TfTCI Order, supra note 9, para. 34.
26. SBC/PacTel Order, supra note 18, para. 76.
27. On November 10, 1997, MCI Communications Corporation and WorldCom, Inc.
announced that they intended to merge into a combined entity in a $36.5 billion deal
("MCI/WorldCom"). Seth Schiesel, MCI Accepts Offer of $36.5 Billion; Deal Sets Record,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 11, 1997, at Al; see also Application of WorldCom, Inc. and MCI
Comm. Corp., Memorandum Opinion and Order, 13 F.C.C.R. 18025, 13 Comm. Reg. (P &
F) 477 (1998).
28. Applications of WorldCom, Inc. and Howard A. White, Trustee, Applications and
Request for Special Temporary Authority, Volume 1, Oct. 1, 1997, p. 33 (footnotes omitted)
(on file with the Journal).
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5. Savings in Purchasing
In the Bell Atlantic/NYNEX merger,29 the parties "expect[ed] to
achieve capital purchasing savings from [the] increased volume discounts
the two companies [would] obtain [by pooling] their annual network capital
expenditures. '"30
In Bell Atlantic/GTE, the FCC stated that "combining these wireless
businesses will likely produce cost savings and operating efficiencies by
reducing the [parties'] collective dependence on costly roaming
agreements."
31
C. Resource-Based Theories
Motivations for telecom mergers can also be explained using
resource-based theories of strategic management that "imply that mergers
may occur when they facilitate the creation or recombination of distinctive
intercompany that confer competitive advantages. 3 2 Resource-based
theory defines a firm as a collection of resources and capabilities and
assumes that different firms' resources and capabilities can be
heterogeneous and immobile. Accordingly, "some firms are better than
other firms at doing some things," and the combination of these
complementary resources and capabilities can enhance value and corporate
profitability.33
Resources can either be tangible items (e.g., raw materials) or
intangible items (e.g., intellectual property, firm-specific human capital,
organizational culture, business relationships, or tacit knowledge).
Capabilities are the experience, abilities, and knowledge that enable a firm
to undertake its activities. While some capabilities are easy for firms to
create on their own, mergers seek to acquire the capabilities that require
considerable investment and time, and are difficult to duplicate in the short
run.
34
29. On April 22, 1996, Bell Atlantic and NYNEX announced that they intended to
merge in a stock-for-stock transaction totaling $22.1 billion ("Bell Atlantic/NYNEX"). See
Mark Landler, Nynex and Bell Atlantic Reach Accord on Merger; Links 36 Million
Customers, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 22, 1996, at Al.
30. Applications of NYNEX Corp. and Bell Atlantic. Corp., Memorandum Opinion and
Order, 12 F.C.C.R. 19985, para. 163, 9 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 187 (1997) [hereinafter Bell
Atlantic/NYNEX Order].
31. Bell Atlantic/GTE Order, supra note 21, para. 377.
32. Ellig, supra note 5, at 193.
33. See id. at 196-97.
34. See id. at 197.
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1. Expansion
Major telecom firms seek to expand their array of services, both in
types of services offered and within geographic areas offered. The
combination of two sets of resources and capabilities allows firms to
implement expansion strategies quickly and efficiently. For example, by
merging existing cable and telephone facilities, the merged entity can offer
a combination of local phone, Internet, long-distance, and broadband
services more rapidly than either of the merging parties could do on its
own. Further examples are provided below.
In the US West/Qwest transaction,35  the FCC believed that
"combining US WEST's expertise in providing xDSL to the local loop with
Qwest's high speed, high-capacity network [would] expedite deployment
of advanced services and on a broader basis than US WEST could have
offered alone." 36
In the SBC/BellSouth transaction,37 the FCC agreed with the parties
"that the creation of another national wireless competitor constitute[d] a
clear, transaction-specific public interest benefit. A significant percentage
of mobile phone users desire nationwide access, and those users will
benefit significantly from the creation of another competitor with a near-
nationwide footprint. "38
In the Deutsche Telekom/VoiceStream/PowerTel transaction,39 the
FCC agreed with the parties "that the build-out and extension of
VoiceStream's network to expand [its] reach significantly, both nationwide
35. On July 18, 1999, Qwest Communications International Inc. announced its intention
to acquire US West, Inc. in a $36 billion deal. See Laura M. Holson, Complex Telephone
Takeover Battle Ends in Compromise, N.Y. TIMES, July 19, 1999, at B6.
36. Applications of Qwest Comm. Int'l Inc. and US West, Inc., Memorandum Opinion
and Order, 15 F.C.C.R. 5376, para. 60, 19 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 1010 (2000).
37. On April 4, 2000, SBC and BellSouth Corp. announced their intention to merge
their wireless operations. The companies would share joint and equal control of the entity,
with SBC having a sixty percent ownership interest and BellSouth having a forty percent
interest in the merged entity ("SBC/BellSouth"). See Seth Schiesel, 2 Phone Giants Said to
Be Near Deal to Merge Wireless Units, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 5, 2000, at Cl; Nicole Harris,
SBC, BellSouth Confirm Venture, WALL ST. J., Apr. 6, 2000, at B 10.
38. Applications of SBC Comm. Inc. and BellSouth Corp., Memorandum Opinion and
Order, 15 F.C.C.R. 25459, para. 48 (2000).
39. On July 23, 2000, Deutsche Telekom AG announced its intention to purchase the
VoiceStream Wireless Corporation for $50.7 billion. See Andrew Ross Sorkin & Simon
Romero, Deutsche Telekom To Pay $50 Billion For U.S. Company, N.Y. TIMES, July 24,
2000, at Al. On August 26, 2000, Deutsche Telekom announced it intended to purchase
PowerTel, Inc. (contingent on consummation of the VoiceStream merger) for $7.1 billion in
stock and debt. See Applications of Voicestream Wireless Corp., PowerTel, Inc., and
Deutsche Telekom AG, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 16 F.C.C.R. 9779, para. 10.
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and internationally, constitute[d] a clear, transaction-specific public interest
benefit." 40
In the SES Global/GE Americom transaction,4' the FCC stated:
The combination of SES's operations with the Americom Licensees'
operations will provide SES Global with the ability to provide satellite
communications services throughout most of the world and could
potentially enable the merged entity to realize economies of scale and
scope in areas such as satellite control operations and research and
development.
42
2. Intangible Benefits. and Synergies
Instant benefits can arise from the acquisition of intangible assets,
"such as brand names, customer relationships, hard-to-duplicate human
capital, functional capabilities, [marketing, technological, and operational]
and best practices."43 These benefits may also be characterized as
"synergies" that relate to the marginal cost savings or quality
improvements from any source other than the realization of economies of
scale.' Examples include improved interoperability between
complementary products (e.g., seamless interface between equipment) and
sharing of complementary skills. "Synergies require cooperation and
coordination of the two firms' assets that allow production on a superior
40. Applications of VoiceStream Wireless Corp., PowerTel, Inc., and Deutsche
Telekom AG, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 16 F.C.C.R. 9779, para. 121, 23 Comm.
Reg. (P & F) 1089 (2001).
41. On March 28, 2001, SES, S.A., a Luxembourg-based satellite communication
company, announced its intention to purchase GE Americom for $5 billion, forming a
combined entity called SES Global. See Andy Patztor, Nikhil Deogun and Matt Murray,
SES Nears Pact To Buy GE's Satellite Unit, WALL ST. J., Mar. 27, 2001, at A3; Press
Release, SES Americom, Combination of SES and GE Americom Creates the World's
Premier Satellite Services Provider (Mar. 28, 2001), available at http://www.gecapital.com/
news/press/03282001 .html.
42. Application of General Electric Capital Corp. and SES Global S.A., Order and
Authorization, 16 F.C.C.R. 17575, para. 52 (2001).
43. Ellig, supra note 5, at 210; see also Bell Atlantic/GTE Order, supra note 21, where
the FCC noted:
Elimination of duplicative or redundant administrative functions and reduction of
future equipment purchases, for instance, are direct consequences of the merger.
The same is true with respect to some types of best practices, such as when
superior methods of provisioning and maintenance operations are transferred
between companies or when economies of scale are achieved as a result of the
merger. Although these cost savings may be merger specific, they may
nonetheless be the result of decreases in output or reductions in product
differentiation.
Id., para. 241 (footnotes omitted).
44. See MAX M. HABECK, ET AL., AFTER THE MERGER: SEVEN STRATEGIES FOR
SUCCESSFUL POST-MERGER INTEGRATION (2000) (suggesting that "growth" synergies should
be the primary reason and focal point of acquisitions).
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production function, as distinct from causing different choices (such as
scale) on a fixed production function. In other words, synergies allow
output/cost configurations that would not be feasible otherwise."45
In SBC/PacTel, the parties argued that the proposed transaction would
bring together two companies with complementary strengths, specifically
SBC's marketing strength and PacTel's technical and cost management
expertise, and that their combination should enhance the development of
new services and products for their local exchange customers.46
In the Arch/PageNet transaction,47  the FCC noted that the
combination of PageNet's narrowband operations with Arch's relative
financial and marketing strength was likely to result in faster and more
robust development of narrowband PCS services.48
In SBC/Ameritech, the FCC deemed only a portion of the cost
savings as "merger-specific." These savings included elimination of
duplicative or redundant administrative functions; the reduction in future
equipment purchases; some types of best practices, such as when superior
methods of provisioning service and maintaining operations are transferred
between companies; and economies of scale or scope that could not be
achieved but for the merger.49
In AT&T/TCI, the FCC stated that TCI will have "instant access to
AT&T's expertise and established telephony brand to support the combined
entity's new product offerings, both on a packaged and individualized
basis, and to support its marketing efforts." 'o The FCC further stated:
[T]he complementary nature of the merging firms' assets means that
the combined firm will be able to provide an alternative to the
incumbent LECs' services for residential customers far more quickly
and effectively than either could separately. TCI possesses the "last
mile" assets, while AT&T possesses a brand name, experience and
financial resources that improve TCI's ability to capitalize on its
network assets. We are committed to ensuring that residential local
45. Joseph Farrell & Carl Shapiro, Scale Economies and Synergies in Horizontal
Merger Analysis, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 685, 693 (2001).
46. SBC/PacTel Order, supra note 18, para. 75.
47. On November 8, 1999, Arch Communications Group, Inc. announced its intention
to buy Paging Networks, Inc. ("Arch/PageNet"). Bloomberg News, Arch Communications
to Take Over Paging Network, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 1999, at C4.
48. Application of Arch Comm. Group, Inc. and Paging Network, Inc., Memorandum
Opinion and Order, 16 F.C.C.R. 3675, para. 17, 20 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 1095 (2000).
49. SBC/Ameritech Order, supra note 11, para. 326.
50. Applications of Tele-Communications, Inc. and AT&T Corp., Memorandum
Opinion and Order, 14 F.C.C.R. 3160, para. 147, 15 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 29 (1999)
[hereinafter AT&T/TCI License Transfer Order].
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exchange competition becomes a reality sooner rather [than] later. One
way this may occur more quickly is through combinations of
complementary assets by emerging entrants such as AT&T and TCI.51
3. Bundling of Services
Several companies strategize to provide bundled services on the
assumption that consumers prefer to purchase multiple services from one
company. Large customers can realize economies of scale by using a single
service provider, while ensuring uniformity of service and functionality
across the enterprise, and establishing single point of accountability for
keeping the network up and running.5"
In AT&T/TCI, the FCC stated as follows:
Post-merger, AT&T-TCI may well have lower costs in billing and
servicing customers that subscribe to several of its products. In such a
case, by offering these products as a package at a price below that of
the individual prices of the package's components when sold
separately, the merged firm would both lower costs and pass at least
some of those cost savings on to consumers. 53
In SBC/PacTel, the FCC was of the view that the bundling of local
access and long-distance services-a form of one-stop shopping-may be a
desirable feature for some customers. The FCC concluded that
SBC/PacTel's potential ability to offer this service would not be inherently
anticompetitive, and the customers who want one-stop shopping would be
able to choose the combined local and long-distance services of
SBC/PacTel or one of its competitors. The FCC noted that one-stop
shopping was a benefit arising from increased competition and that the
FCC should not stop any carrier from being the first to provide it. The FCC
stated that its priority was to promote efficient competition, not to protect
competitors.54
4. Research and Development
Technological change also motivates M&A. The large incumbents
may be unable to achieve technological advances as quickly as smaller and
more innovative companies. Alternatively, a firm may not have access to
R&D resources for a particular technology or service. Given the rapid pace
of innovation, firms may not have the time to develop innovations in-house
51. Id. para. 48.
52. See Ellig, supra note 5, at 210.
53. A T&T/TCI License Transfer Order, supra note 50, para. 125.
54. SBC/PacTel Order, supra note 18, para. 48.
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if they seek to remain competitive and may need to purchase such
innovations to keep up.55
In SBC/PacTel, the FCC recognized that the proposed transfer would
permit the companies to pool their R&D resources and thus avoid some
duplication, and that PacTel would benefit from SBC's larger R&D
subsidiary without having to undertake a costly expansion on its own.
56
In Bell Atlantic/NYNEX, the parties expected to save substantially in
annual capital expenses by consolidating field trials of new equipment and
test laboratories.57
In the SBC/SNET transaction, 58 the FCC also noted that SNET's
access to improved research capabilities would be a major benefit of the
merger, and that consumers were "likely to see the benefits of ADSL
technology more quickly as a result of SNET's merger with SBC."'5 9
D. Network Externalities
Transactions in the telecom industry often produce significant cost
savings due to their "network" infrastructures. A "network" is a "set of
interconnected production, distribution or consumption activities in which
the value of the relevant activity to any one participant depends, in part,
upon the nature and intensity of the production, distribution or consumption
of other participants. 60 Network externalities arise when the value of a
product increases as more people use it. To take the simplest example, the
more people who use the telephone network, the greater its value to all
network users, as well as to the owner of the network. Consumers may
benefit from the increased likelihood of systems compatibility and
interchangeability as well as from the achievement of scale and scope
economies that lower the incremental cost of providing the product or
service.
Thus, a telecom merger that combines two networks will
automatically increase the value placed on the networks, thereby creating
55. Phil Prentice & Mark Fox, Technology Firms: The Impact of Mergers and
Acquisitions, 13 INT'L COMPANY & COM. L.REV. 321, 324 (2002).
56. SBC/PacTel Order, supra note 18, para. 76.
57. Bell Atlantic/NYNEX Order, supra note 30, para. 163.
58. On January 5, 1998, SBC announced its intention to acquire Southern New England
Telecommunications Corporation ("SNET") in a $4.4 billion transaction. Press Release,
SBC, Southern New England Telecommunications to Merge with SBC Communications,
(Jan. 5, 1998), available at http://www.sbc.com/press-room/1 ,,31,00.html?query=6492.
59. Applications of Southern New England Telecomm. Corp. to SBC Comm., Inc.,
Memorandum Opinion and Order, 13 F.C.C.R. 21292, para. 45, 14 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 24
(1998) (footnote omitted).
60. Schwindt & Globerman, supra note 7, at 303.
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consumption externalities. Further, if a telecom merger permits, for
example, the merging companies to integrate more efficiently their
technology platforms in order to provide advanced services (e.g., video
telephony), more subscribers will be drawn to the network to receive the
advanced services, and the network and its intrinsic value to all network
members will therefore increase. These externalities can be characterized
"as increments to consumer surplus" that should assist in offsetting any
anticompetitive effects of higher postmerger prices, or, alternatively, as the
"cost savings that subscribers will enjoy by being able to substitute" the
advanced services for their next best and more expensive alternative. 61
E. Technological and Standardization Efficiencies
Standardization of technology resulting from the combination of
networks can generate significant social gains, particularly when the
standard adopted is superior to alternatives. The gains may be less
apparent, or not as readily achievable, however, where there are issues of
compatibility between the networks.62 However, in addition to the creation
of societal gains, the adoption of a dominant standard may engender certain
costs on society. For example, the amalgamation of two wireless networks
(and the subsequent retirement of one of the two systems) could impose
significant migration costs on users and equipment providers.
III. COMPETITION REVIEW AND TELECOM MERGERS
A. United States
Both the FCC and U.S. Department of Justice ("DOJ") review
telecom mergers in the United States. The FCC's review of telecom
mergers arises by virtue of its power to approve the transfer of certain
telecom licenses under the Communications Act of 1934.63 In determining
whether to approve a requested license transfer, the FCC deploys a "public
interest" standard, which is a broader consideration than the standard
antitrust "substantially lessening of competition" test, and encompasses the
broad goals of the Communications Act (which include universal service,
the deployment of new advanced services, the preservation of quality
services, and diversity in broadcast programs). 64
61. Id. at 304.
62. Id. at 308.
63. Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.).
64. Le Blanc & Shelanski, supra note 1, at 14.
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One of the prominent public interest factors is whether the proposed
merger would foster or hinder competition and thereby affect consumers. In
this regard, the FCC will conduct its own market analysis based upon
information collected through public comments and submissions by the
transaction parties. The FCC normally conducts its analysis based upon (1)
definition of markets, (2) examination of participants and likely entrants,
and (3) a determination of how the merger would enhance concentration or
allow the merged entity to exercise market power.
The FCC also appears to consider efficiencies in a manner consistent
with the DOJ's approach,65 but then recognizes in certain transactions a
broader range of potential benefits as being in the "public interest."
Moreover, given the more recent public pronouncements by various U.S.
antitrust officials suggesting that at least during the investigative stages a
broader range of benefits might be recognized, the distinctions between the
FCC's broader public interest-based grounds for permitting a transaction
and the DOJ's efficiencies grounds may be blurring.
B. European Union
EU competition policies are set out in Articles 3, 81, and 82 of the
European Community Treaty, under which the overall objective is to
"[ensure] that competition in the internal market is not distorted."66 In
1989, the European Council adopted the ECMR in order to provide the
Competition Directorate of the European Commission ("EC") express
authority to review mergers and other concentrations. Under the ECMR:
[The EC is required to] determine whether the transaction is
"compatible with the common market." If a merger creates or
strengthens a dominant position such that effective competition would
be significantly impeded in the common market or in a substantial part
of it, the transaction is [determined to be] "incompatible with the
common market" and may be prohibited. The ECMR merger review
framework operates under standards less explicit than those established
in the United States.67
65. See U.S. Dep't of Justice and Fed. Trade Comm'n, Horizontal Merger Guidelines §
4 (rev. ed. 1997), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/horizbook/
hmgl.html [hereinafter Horizontal Merger Guidelines].
66. Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the European Community, 2002
O.J. (C 325) 1, 40.
67. Kevin R. Sullivan, et al., Antitrust Scrutiny of Telecommunications Mergers, Joint
Ventures and Strategic Alliances-A Shift From Regulation to Enforcement, Paper for the
International Bar Association Section of Business Law's 10th Annual
Seminar on Telecommunications Services and Competition Law in Europe (May 10-1I,
1999), available at http://www.kslaw.comlibrary/articles.asp?16. "However, in October
1997 the [EC] published a notice providing guidance as to how it determines the relevant
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C. Canada
Traditionally, anticompetitive behavior in the Canadian telecom
industry has been regulated by the Canadian Radio-television and
Telecommunications Commission ("CRTC") through the enforcement of
policies under the Canadian Telecommunications Act, 68 such as just and
reasonable rates, equal access, and nondiscrimination. However, the CRTC
has no independent authority to review and approve telecom mergers; such
mergers fall under the ambit and jurisdiction of the Canadian Competition
Bureau ("Canadian Bureau"). The Canadian Bureau and the CRTC share a
common goal of fostering the growth of competitive communications
markets. The two government agencies have regarded their respective roles
as "complementary," particularly in the transition from an environment of
regulated telecom monopolies to one of unregulated multiple competitive
networks. 69
The overall analytical framework adopted in Canada for M&A review
is similar to that adopted by U.S. antitrust authorities. The Canadian
Competition Act7" is administered by the Commissioner of Competition
("Canadian Commissioner"), who is appointed by the federal cabinet and
oversees the Canadian Bureau. The Canadian Bureau focuses on market
power by adopting a hypothetical-monopolist approach71 to market
market in reviewing competition cases, including mergers and joint ventures." Id. (footnote
omitted).
68. Telecommunications Act, ch. 38, 1993 S.C. 1475 (Can).
69. In 1997, Robert Lancop, then Assistant Deputy Director of Investigation and
Research, Civil Matters, at the Canadian Bureau, defined the Bureau's growing role in the
changing telecom regulatory environment:
The Bureau's experience with the deregulation of other industries such as the
transportation sector, suggests that communications deregulation is soon
likely to be accompanied by a degree of industry restructuring through
mergers and acquisitions and the formation of strategic alliances. Moreover,
global strategic alliances are becoming increasingly common as firms seek
partners and new approaches to doing business in a rapidly changing
environment. The Director [now Commissioner] will be carefully examining
mergers and other transactions in this sector to determine if they prevent or
lessen competition substantially without giving rise to offsetting efficiency
gains.
Robert G. Lancop, The Role of the Competition Bureau in the Communications
Marketplace, Remarks at the Third Annual Wireless Communications Congress (Oct. 27,
1997), available at http://cb-bc.gc.ca/epic/intemet/incb-bc.nsf/vwGeneratedlnterE/
ctO441e.html.
70. Competition Act, R.S.C., c. C-34 (1985) (Can.).
71. For merger analysis under the Canadian Competition Act, a relevant market is
defined conceptually in terms of the smallest group of products and smallest geographic
area in relation to which sellers, if acting as a single firm (a "hypothetical monopolist") that
was the only seller of those products in that area, could profitably impose and sustain a
significant and nontransitory price increase above levels that would likely exist in the
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definition and a generally similar approach to the analysis of barriers to
entry and other qualitative assessment criteria. After the Canadian Bureau
assesses a proposed merger, the Canadian Commissioner decides whether
to approve the merger or to challenge the merger before the Competition
Tribunal ("Tribunal"), a quasi-judicial body comprised of judges and lay
members (typically economists or individuals with business experience).
The Tribunal acts independently and separately from the Commissioner
and the Bureau and has exclusive jurisdiction to adjudicate mergers.
IV. TREATMENT OF EFFICIENCIES IN ANTITRUST
MERGER REVIEW
A. United States
1. From Hostility to Skepticism to Cautious Acceptance
As stated above, U.S. competition authorities have been historically
hostile to M&A that increased market share concentration significantly,
regardless of whether they produced efficiencies. In the 1960s and mid-
1970s, the enforcement agencies and courts viewed the creation of
efficiencies as potentially anticompetitive. Today, while the hostility has
for the most part disappeared, the road to acceptance has been, and
continues to be, a difficult one.
The governing substantive statute for U.S. M&A review is Section 7
of the Clayton Act.72 This section prohibits transactions in which the effect
may be "substantially to lessen competition" or to tend to create a
monopoly.73 However, the section is silent on the issue of efficiencies.
Thus, in 1995, the role of efficiencies in M&A antitrust review was
examined in the Global Competitive Hearings conducted by the U.S.
Federal Trade Commission ("FTC"). The resulting report ("FTC Global
Report") 74 endorsed integrating further efficiencies into the competitive
effects analysis. Following issuance of the FTC Global Report, the FTC
and the DOJ formed a joint task force to examine the role of efficiencies
which culminated in the adoption of the 1997 Efficiencies Amendment to
absence of the merger. COMPETITION BUREAU, INDUSTRY CANADA, MERGER ENFORCEMENT
GUIDELINES pt. 3.1 (1991), available at http://strategis.ic.gc.ca/pics/ct/meg-full.pdf
[hereinafter CANADIAN MERGER GUIDELINES].
72. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2002).
73. Id.
74. FTC, Hearings on Global and Innovation-Based Competition, Dkt./Case No.
P951201 (Oct. 12, 1995), available at http://www.ftc.gov/opp/global/GC101295.htm
[hereinafter FTC Global Report].
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the 1992 Guidelines ("U.S. 1997 Revisions"). 75 The U.S. 1997 Revisions
tied efficiencies directly to the competitive effects analysis, recognizing
that lower costs may reduce the likelihood of coordinated interaction or the
incentive to raise prices unilaterally. The list of recognized efficiencies was
expanded to include improved quality, enhanced service, or new products.
Efficiencies arising from anticompetitive reductions in output, service, or
other competitively significant categories, such as innovation, were
specifically excluded from the U.S. 1997 Revisions.
Pursuant to the U.S. 1997 Revisions, efficiencies must be
"cognizable," i.e., they must be: (1) merger-specific, 76 (2) verified,77 and
(3) not the result of anticompetitive reductions in output. The merger-
specific requirement is significant because "[i]nstead of requiring proof that
claimed efficiencies could not be achieved through some hypothetical
alternatives such as unilateral expansion or competitor collaborations, [the
U.S. antitrust authorities] have committed to evaluate claimed efficiencies
against other practical alternatives. '"78
The U.S. 1997 Revisions incorporate a sliding scale approach under
which the agencies will require proof of greater efficiencies as the likely
anticompetitive effects of the transaction increase. The stronger the case for
potential anticompetitive effects of a transaction, the greater the burden on
the merger parties to demonstrate cognizable efficiencies. In a transaction
suggesting strong anticompetitive potential, the parties shoulder a very high
burden of proof that credible efficiencies will overcome the potential
anticompetitive effects. Thus, the U.S. 1997 Revisions embrace the
75. DOJ & FTC, Horizontal Merger Guidelines (rev. ed. Apr. 8, 1997), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/horiz-book/hmgl.html [hereinafter U.S. Merger
Guidelines and U.S. 1997 Revisions].
76. As FTC Chairman Muris wrote, "[T]he focus should not be on whether another
method might exist to lower costs, but instead on whether the method is more or less costly
than the merger and whether it can be implemented as rapidly as the merger." Timothy J.
Muris, The Government and Merger Efficiencies: Still Hostile After All These Years, 7 GEO.
MASON L. REV. 729, 732 (1999) [hereinafter Muris 1999 Article].
77. According to the U.S. 1997 Revisions:
the merging firms must substantiate efficiency claims so that the [a]gency can
verify by reasonable means the likelihood and magnitude of each asserted
efficiency, how and when each would be achieved (and any costs of doing so),
how each would enhance the merged firm's ability and incentive to compete, and
why each would be merger specific.
U.S. Merger Guidelines and U.S. 1997 Revisions, supra note 75, ch. 4.
78. Robert Pitofsky, Efficiencies in Defense of Mergers: 18 Months After, Remarks to
George Mason Law Review Antitrust Symposium: The Changing Face of Efficiency (Oct.
16, 1998), available at http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/pitofsky/pitofeff.htm [hereinafter
Pitofsky remarks].
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principle that efficiencies almost never justify a merger to monopoly or
near monopoly.
Today, it is clear that the U.S. antitrust authorities, as a matter of their
prosecutorial discretion, will consider efficiencies in close cases.79 In the
courts, however, the authorities appear to be still arguing that efficiencies
cannot, and do not, trump high concentration levels. Since 1990, only four
U.S. courts of appeals have considered the role of efficiencies in an M&A
context.8 ° In addition, in about a half-dozen M&A challenges, the district
court considered whether efficiencies rebutted the government's prima
facie showing of anticompetitive effects based solely on market share and
concentration. 81 In almost all court proceedings, the government has won
on its prima facie case because the very high concentration levels asserted
resulted in an insurmountable level of reluctance, if not hostility, against
acceptance of the efficiencies proffered by the merging parties.
79. Ilene Knable Gotts & Calvin S. Goldman, The Role of Efficiencies in M&A Global
Antitrust Review: Still in Flux?, 29 INT'L ANTITRUST L. & POL'Y, FORDHAM CORP. L. INST
PROC. 201, 212 (Barry E. Hawk ed., 2003); see also, e.g., Statement of the FTC
Amerisource Health Corp./Bergen Brunswig Corp., File No. 011-0122 (Aug. 24, 2001),
available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2001/08/amerisourcestatement.pdf (stating that the 4-2-3
merger was permitted to proceed, at least in part, due to efficiencies); Timothy J. Muris,
Understanding Mergers: Strategy and Planning, Implementation, and Outcomes, Remarks to
the FTC's Roundtable on Understanding Mergers: Strategy and Planning, Implementation,
and Outcomes (Dec. 9, 2002), available at http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/muris/
mergers021209.htm [hereinafter Muris FTC Roundtable Remarks].
80. FTC v. Tenet Health Care Corp., 186 F.3d 1045 (8th Cir. 1999) (finding that
efficiencies are not merger specific and are too speculative); FTC v. Butterworth Health
Corp., No. 96-2440, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 40805 (6th Cir. July 8, 1997); FTC v. Univ.
Health, Inc., 938 F.2d 1206 (11th Cir. 1991); FTC v. H.J. Heinz Co., 116 F. Supp. 2d 190
(D.D.C. 2000), rev'd, 246 F.3d 708 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
81. See generally United States v. Country Lakes Foods, Inc., 754 F. Supp. 669, 674
(D. Minn. 1990). Country Lakes Foods was the only litigated nonhospital case in which
efficiencies due to scale economies of product were expressly recognized. In United States
v. United Tote, Inc., 768 F. Supp. 1064 (D. Del. 1991), it was assumed that the merger
would result in valid efficiency gains for the combined entity. The court found the
efficiency gains would be insufficient to offset anticompetitive aspects and that there was no
guarantee that the savings would be passed through to consumers. In FTC v. Staples, Inc.,
970 F. Supp. 1066 (D.D.C. 1997), the parties claimed that a combined entity would save
between $4.9 and $6.5 billion over five years, including savings as a result of being able to
extract better prices from vendors. The court rejected efficiencies as largely unverified from
internal documents and failed to establish merger specificity since both parties were
expanding rapidly on their own and Staples had passed through only 15-17% of past cost-
savings. In FTC v. Cardinal Health, Inc., 1998-2 Trade Cas. (CCH), para. 72,226 (D.D.C.
1998), the anticipated cost savings from increased economies of scale, including distribution
center consolidation, elimination of corporate overhead, better purchasing practices, and
increased volume buying power, were deemed to be acheivable without the merger taking
place. Because of the high market concentration, the court found that the efficiencies were
not enough to outweigh the costs of foregoing competition. See also H.J. Heinz Co., 116 F.
Supp. 2d 190; FTC v. Swedish Match, 131 F. Supp. 2d 151 (D.D.C. 2000).
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The recent Heinz case82 illustrates this judicial deference to
concentration levels and concomitant hostility toward efficiencies in the
United States. In an FTC preliminary injunction challenge to the
transaction, the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia found that
the merger parties had rebutted the presumption created by the high and
increasing market concentration by proving "extraordinary" efficiencies.83
Subsequently, the FTC sought and obtained from the D.C. Circuit Court a
stay of the district court's decision and an injunction of the merger, pending
appeal. After a hearing, the D.C. Circuit Court found the efficiencies
evidence insufficient, both as a defense and as a basis for showing
postmerger coordination unlikely, thereby effectively killing the
transaction. Although the D.C. Circuit Court exhibited extreme skepticism
and hostility to efficiencies due to the concentration levels that would exist
postmerger, it did leave open the possibility that, at least in some cases, an
efficiencies defense could succeed. The court held that the high market
concentration levels present in Heinz required, in rebuttal, proof of
"extraordinary" efficiencies.8 4
2. Signs of Acceptance
The preference of the enforcement agencies historically has been to
condemn transactions resulting in high concentration levels even in the face
of likely significant efficiencies, rather than chance the possibility of
permitting a transaction with potential adverse competitive effects to
proceed. Although we agree there are transactions that should be viewed as
"unthinkable," even though they may create some efficiencies, it is in the
closer calls that care must be taken not to prematurely judge a transaction
as "good" or "bad" due to the disparity between the burdens imposed on
the government and on the transaction parties. In those transactions killed
by such insurmountable presumptions, there will never be an opportunity
for society to potentially benefit from the associated efficiency gains. FTC
Chairman Muris recently recognized the "chicken and egg" problem: due
to adverse court decisions in the efficiencies area, some antitrust attorneys
advise their clients not to make the effort necessary to develop their best
efficiencies arguments, which results in the lack of favorable efficiencies
precedent.85 He indicates, however, that "internally we take substantial
well-documented efficiencies arguments seriously. And we recognize that
mergers can lead to a variety of efficiencies beyond reductions in variable
82. H.J. Heinz Co., 116 F. Supp. 2d 190.
83. Id. at 198-200.
84. 246 F.3d at 720.
85. Muris FTC Roundtable Remarks, supra note 79.
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CoStS. '8 6 Moreover, Chairman Muris indicated that efficiencies can be
important in cases that result in consent decrees and in the formulation of
remedies that preserve competition while allowing the parties to achieve
most, if not all, efficiencies. He reassured antitrust counsel that well-
presented credible efficiencies will be given due consideration by the FTC
in merger review.
3. The Role of Efficiencies in FCC Reviews
As stated above, the FCC reviews efficiencies in the context of the
public interest. In Bell Atlantic/NYNEX, the FCC described the role of
efficiencies in its public interest analysis:
Efficiencies are the pro-competitive benefits of a merger that improve
market performance. Efficiencies generated through a merger can
mitigate competitive harms if such efficiencies enhance the merged
firm's ability and incentive to compete and therefore result in lower
prices, improved quality, enhanced service or new products. Pro-
competitive efficiencies include only those efficiencies that are merger
specific, i.e., that would not be achievable but for the proposed merger.
Efficiencies that can be achieved through means less harmful to
competition than the proposed merger, therefore, cannot be considered
to be true pro-competitive benefits of the merger. Efficiencies are
particularly significant if they improve market performance in a
relevant market and thereby reduce the competitive harms otherwise
presented by the proposed merger. In order to mitigate competitive
harms, however, efficiencies cannot result from anti-competitive
reductions in output or service. Applicants bear the burden of showing
both that merger specific efficiencies will occur, and that they
sufficiently offset any harm to competition such that we can conclude
that the transaction is pro-competitive and therefore in the public
interest. Finally, applicants cannot carry their burden if their efficiency
claims are vague or speculative, and cannot be verified by reasonable
means.
87
The FCC was careful to caution: "Efficiencies are most likely to make
a difference in our public interest review of a merger when the likely
adverse competitive effects, absent the efficiencies, are not great. However,
efficiencies almost never justify a merger to monopoly or near-
monopoly. 8
The FCC uses a strict test of merger specificity in deciding whether to
accept claimed efficiencies. For example, in SBC/Ameritech, the FCC
found that only a portion of the benefits claimed by the parties were merger
86. Id.
87. Applications of NYNEX Corp., and Bell At. Corp., Memorandum Opinion and
Order, 12 F.C.C.R. 19985, para. 158, 9 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 187 (1997).
88. Id. para. 159.
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specific and that each company could expand geographically or offer the
products on its own. The FCC stated:
Specifically, each company individually could expand its respective
wireless footprints through other acquisitions or joint ventures that do
not threaten equivalent public interest harms. Each company could
offer out-of-region Internet services today, so expanding its customer
base of dial-up customers [that] could be achieved absent this merger.
Each company could offer long distance services out-of-region and
abroad today absent the merger. In-region, each company's ability to
offer long distance services is subject to Section 271 authorizations
which are not dependent on this merger. Each company could secure
large business customers today in the global seamless services market
by leveraging its substantial international holdings and by introducing
a full suite of local and long distance voice and data products. These
activities, therefore, are not dependent on the merger and could be
accomplished individually.
89
The FCC also requires that claimed benefits be "verifiable." Because
much of the information relating to the potential benefits of a merger is in
the sole possession of the merging parties, those parties must provide
sufficient support for any benefit claims so that the FCC can verify the
likelihood and magnitude of each claimed benefit. In this regard, the
magnitude of recognized benefits must take into account the cost of
achieving them. Moreover, speculative benefits that cannot be verified will
be discounted or dismissed. Thus, for example, benefits that are to occur
only in the distant future may be discounted or dismissed because, among
other things, predictions about the more distant future are inherently more
speculative than predictions about events that are expected to occur closer
to the present. 90
Further, benefits are generally counted only to the extent that they can
mitigate any anticompetitive effects of the merger. Since, in general,
reductions in marginal cost are more likely to result in lower equilibrium
prices, the FCC has stated that it is "more likely [to] find marginal cost
reductions to be cognizable than reductions in fixed cost."91
Like the U.S. antitrust authorities, the FCC applies a sliding scale
approach to evaluating potential benefits, under which it will require
applicants to demonstrate that claimed benefits are more likely and more
89. SBC/AmeriTech Order, supra note 11, para. 347.
90. Application of EchoStar Comm. Corp. and EchoStar Comm. Corp., Hearing
Designation Order, 17 F.C.C.R. 20559, para. 190 (2002) [hereinafter EchoStar].
91. Id. para. 191.
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substantial the greater the likelihood and magnitude of potential harms.
More specifically:
As the harms to the public interest become greater and more certain,
the degree and certainty of the public interest benefits must also
increase commensurately in order for us to find that the transaction on
balance serves the public interest. This sliding scale approach requires
that where, as here, potential harms are indeed both substantial and
likely, the Applicants' demonstration of claimed benefits also must
reveal a higher degree of magnitude and likelihood than we would
otherwise demand.9
In its review of the proposed DirecTV/EchoStar merger, the FCC
noted that the case law under antitrust laws has been generally hostile to
proposed mergers that would have unfavorable impacts on the competitive
structure, because such mergers are likely to increase the incentive and
ability to engage in anticompetitive conduct. Competitive impacts are an
important aspect of the FCC's public interest standard and the
Telecommunications Act of 1996."3 The FCC stated:
Competition in the communications industries is the cornerstone of our
modem communications policy because it is well recognized that
competition, rather than regulation of monopoly providers, has the
greatest potential to bring consumer welfare gains of lower prices and
more innovative services. Accordingly, a proposed transaction's
consistency with the Act, our rules and competition policy in general is
an integral part of our public interest review.
94
B. European Union
1. EU Precedent Generally Not Favorable to Efficiencies
To date, the European Union has not viewed efficiencies favorably in
its merger review. In 1989, the Counsel of the European Communities
issued the ECMR, which sets forth a comprehensive procedure pursuant to
which the EC reviews the potential competitive impact of a transaction to
determine whether to block the transaction.95 The ECMR has a two-prong
test: (1) creation or reinforcement of a market dominance position, and
(2) resulting market power capable of significantly impeding effective
92. SBC/AmeriTech Order, supra note 11, para. 256 (footnote omitted)
93. The Telecommunications Act of 1996 aimed to establish a pro-competitive,
deregulatory national policy framework that would open all telecommunications markets to
competition, so as to accelerate private sector deployment of advanced telecommunications
and information technologies. See Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified at scattered
sections of 47 U.S.C.).
94. EchoStar, supra note 90, para. 276.
95. Council Regulation (EEC) No. 4064/89 of 21 December 1989 on the Control of
Concentrations between Undertakings, 1989 O.J. (L 395) 1 [hereinafter ECMR].
Number 1]
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS LAW JOURNAL
competition in a relevant market. In a series of European Court of Justice
decisions, the court has indicated that market shares of fifty percent may
result in a legal presumption of dominance.9 6
Article 2(1) of the ECMR contains a detailed list of the factors that
the EC must consider in its analysis, which include "the development of
technical and economic progress provided that it is to consumers'
advantage and does not form an obstacle to competition."97 Thus, the
ECMR, on its face, appears to require the EC to take into account
efficiencies as a factor in determining whether the transaction creates or
strengthens a dominant position, so long as (1) consumers benefit, and (2)
the efficiencies do not become an obstacle to competition. The requirement
that the technical and economic progress should not form an obstacle to
competition makes it unlikely that a dominant firm will be able to assert
efficiencies as a defense since any improvement in efficiency may enhance
its market power. In such cases, efficiencies may even be treated as an
offense. This view is illustrated by the EC's actions in Du Pont/IC198 and
Shell,' two transactions in which the EC required undertakings that sought
to provide comparable or shared efficiency benefits for competitors before
allowing the transactions to proceed."0
The debate over the role of efficiencies has existed from the very
outset of the ECMR regime. In AT&TNCR, °1 the EC rejected the
transaction parties' contentions that the merger would achieve important
synergies in the development of more advanced communications
technologies and noted that the potential advantages flowing from such
96. See, e.g., Case C-62/86, AKZO Chemie BV v. Comm'n, 1991 E.C.R. 1-3359, 1-
3453, [1993] 5 C.M.L.R. 215, 279.
97. ECMR, supra note 95, at 3.
98. Comm'n Decision of 30 September 1992 Declaring the Compatibility of a
Concentration with the Common Market (Case No. IV/M214-Du Pont/ICI), 1993 O.J. (L
7) 13 [hereinafter Du Pont].
99. Comm'n Decision of 8 June 1994 Declaring the Compatibility of a Concentration
with the Common Market (Case No. IV/M. 269-Shell/Montecatini), 1994 O.J. (L 332) 48
[hereinafter Shell].
100. The EC permitted the Du Pont/ICI merger to occur only after Du Pont agreed to
transfer to a third party a freestanding research and development facility of comparable
quality to those operated by Du Pont and ICI. Du Pont, supra note 98, at 23. In Shell, the
transaction parties were required to proffer undertakings that would preserve a second
independent source of polypropylene technology licensing before the EC permitted the
concentration to proceed. These undertakings were later withdrawn by the EC as no longer
necessary in light of the FTC consent and subsequent sale of all of Shell's polypropylene
technology assets. See Comm'n Decision of 24 April 1996 Amending Decision 94/81 1/EC
Declaring the Compatibility of a Concentration with the Common Market (Case No. IV/M.
269-Shell/Montecatini), 1996 O.J. (L 294) 10.
101. Non-Opposition to a Notified Concentration (Case No. IV/M 050-AT&T/NCR),
1991 O.J. (C 16) 20.
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synergies may create or strengthen a dominant position. Subsequent EC
decisions continued to exhibit hostility toward efficiencies. For instance, a
few years later in Accor/Wagons-Lits,'0 2 the EC considered whether the
transaction would create a dominant position in the French motorway
catering market. The EC rejected Accor's claims of scale economies,
indicating that the combined firm "[would] have no interest to pass any
assumed gains on to the consumer" because there might be potential
diseconomies of scale; the cost reductions were not merger specific, and
the concentration would form a significant obstacle to efficient
competition. 103
In some cases, however, efficiencies have been an important basis for
the EC's decision to clear a transaction.' °4 Even in a joint venture context,
the EC has at times treated efficiencies as an offense rather than a defense.
For example, in BertlesmannlKirch/Premiere,'05  the EC rejected a
proposed concentrative joint venture between Kirch and Bertelsmann to
provide technical and administrative support for German digital pay-TV
services. The EC summarily questioned the joint venture's likelihood of
achieving the economies claimed, once it determined that the joint venture
would create a dominant position in pay-TV markets. 0 6 Similarly, the EC
blocked the formation of Nordic Satellite Distribution,'0 7 a proposed
concentrative joint venture for satellite TV transponder services between
102. Comm'n Decision of 28 April 1992 Declaring the Compatibility with the Common
Market of a Concentration (Case No. IV/M. 126-Accor/Wagons-Lits), 1992 O.J. (L 204)
1.
103. Id. at 10.
104. See Comm'n Decision of 11 Feb. 1998 Declaring a Concentration to be Compatible
with the Common Market and the Functioning of the EEA Agreement (Case No
IV/M.986-Agfa-Gevaert/DuPont) 1998 O.J. (L 211) 22; (Case No. IV/M.906-
Mannesmann/Vallourec) Notification of 25/04/1997 Pursuant to Article 4 of Council
[Regulation] 4064/89, available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/mergers/cases/
decisions/m906_en.pdf; Comm'n Decision of 14 February 1995 Relating to a Proceeding
Pursuant to Council Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89 (Case No. IV/M.477-Mercedes
Benz/Kissbohrer), 1995 O.J. (C 211) 1; Non-Opposition to a Notified Concentration (Case
No. IV/M.354-Cyanamid/Shell), 1993 O.J. (C 273) 6; Comm'n Decision of 12 April 1991
Declaring the Compatibility with the Common Market of a Concentration (Case No
1V/M042-Alcatel/Telettra), 1991 O.J. (L 122) 48; see also Peter D. Camesasca, The
Explicit Efficiency Defence in Merger Control: Does It Make the Difference?, 20(1) EUR.
COMPETITION L. REv. 14 (1999) (indicating that the EC relied upon efficiencies to clear
these mergers).
105. Comm'n Decision of 27 May 1998 Relating to a Proceeding Pursuant to Council
Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89 (Case No IV/M.993-Bertelsmann/Kirch/Premiere), 1999
O.J. (L 53) 1.
106. Id. at 23-24.
107. Comm'n Decision of 19 July 1995 Declaring a Concentration to be Incompatible
with the Common Market and the Functioning of the EEA Agreement (Case No.
IV/M.490-Nordic Satellite Distribution), 1996 O.J. (L53) 20.
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two Scandinavian telecom operations and a major Swedish content
provider for TV programs. The EC expressed concerns regarding both
market shares for transponder services and possible spillover effects in the
upstream market where the parent companies enjoyed market power.1°8 The
EC did not view vertical integration of the operation of the transponders
and content as necessary for a satellite operation to promote the satellite's
operations. o9
The EC's decision in the proposed GE/Honeywell 10 merger provides
a stark example of the potential divergence between the United States and
the European Union in the treatment of efficiencies in merger review.lII
After the EC prohibited the merger, EC Commissioner Mario Monti stated
that the parties did not in his view "provide a clearly articulated and
quantified defense in terms of efficiencies." '12 Notwithstanding the
contrary opinion of the DOJ, the EC has maintained that price cuts
resulting from mixed bundling of products are not the type of real
efficiency that should be taken into account in a merger analysis, but
instead constitute a form of "strategic pricing" by the merged firm. 3
GE and Honeywell have appealed the decision to the European Court
of Justice in Luxembourg.
2. Signs of Possible Change in Perspective in the Near Future
Critics have argued that a merger policy that does not take into
account efficiency gains (including cost savings that are passed on to
consumers in the form of lower prices) may be harmful to European
competitiveness, especially in high-tech industries.' 14 Indeed, following the
debates in the European Parliament on the EC's competition policy report
108. Id. at 31, 33.
109. Id. at 38.
110. Comm'n Decision of 03/07/2001 Declaring a Concentration to be Incompatible
with the Common Mkt. and the EEA Agreement (Case No COMP/M.2220-General
Electric/Honeywell), available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/mergers/cases/
decisions/m2220_en.pdf; see also Donna E. Patterson & Carl Shapiro, Transatlantic
Divergence in GE/Honeywell: Causes and Lessons, 16 ANTITRUST 18 (2001).
111. The transaction was cleared in both the U.S. and Canada. See Press Release, DOJ,
Justice Department Requires Divestitures in Merger Between General Electric and
Honeywell, May 2, 2001, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/press-releases/2001/
8140.htm; Bloomberg News, EU Blocks General Electric's Purchase of Honeywell, (July 3,
2001), available at http://www.ibj.com/daily/IBJDstories/04D070301.html.
112. Mario Monti, Antitrust in the U.S. and Europe: A History of Convergence, Remarks
to the General Counsel Roundtable of the ABA (Nov. 14, 2001), available at
http://www.eurunion.org/News/speeches/2001/011114mm.htm.
113. Gotz Drauz, Unbundling GE/Honeywell: The Assessment of Conglomerate Merger
Under EC Competition Law, 25 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 885, 907 (2002).
114. Ilzkovitz & Meiklejohn, supra note 6, at 11.
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for 1999, the European Parliament issued resolutions that called for
"efficiency and other pro-competitive elements" to be taken into account."1 5
Accordingly, the EC recently indicated that it is examining its views on
efficiencies and may view efficiencies more favorably in the future.1" 6 In
July 2002, Commissioner Monti stated, "[W]e are not against mergers that
create more efficient firms. Such mergers tend to benefit consumers, even
if competitors might suffer from increased competition."' 17 Commissioner
Monti has offered further guidance concerning the likely direction of
certain pending changes. Most notable from a substantive standpoint, he (1)
expressed support for an efficiencies defense, 18 (2) noted that reform will
be accompanied by the issuance of interpretive market power guidelines to
assist in providing market definition and in determining how efficiency
considerations should be taken into account, and (3) indicated that the
European Union will not stop mergers simply because they reduce cost and
allow the combined firm to offer lower prices, thereby reducing or
eliminating competition. Commissioner Monti concluded, however, that "it
is appropriate to maintain a touch of 'healthy scepticism' with regard to
efficiency claims, particularly in relation to transactions which appear to
present competition problems." ' 9
On November 7, 2002, Commissioner Monti gave a major address in
which, among other things, he explained further the evolving role of
115. Minutes of 24 Oct. 2000, 2001 O.J. (C 197) 20.
116. A debate on the role of efficiencies under the ECMR was launched on December
11, 2001, with the publication of a green paper addressing EU merger policy and practices.
EUR. COMM'N, GREEN PAPER ON THE REVIEW OF COUNCIL REGULATION No. 4064/89 (2001),
available at www.europa.eu.int/comm/competition/mergers/review/green-paper/en.pdf.
Indeed, a broader philosophical discussion is also underway regarding whether to replace
the dominance test with the substantial lessening of competition test in existence elsewhere,
including in the U.S. and Canada. See, e.g., EUR. COMM'N, GREEN PAPER ON THE REVIEW OF
COUNCIL REGULATION (EEC) No. 4064/89: SUMMARY OF REPLIES RECEIVED, at 15-20.
117. Mario Monti, The Future for Competition Policy in the European Union, Speech at
Merchant Taylor's Hall, London (July 9, 2001), available at http://europa.eu/int/rapid/
start/cgi/guesten.ksh?p action.gettxt=gt&doc=SPEECH/01/340/0.
118. Commissioner Monti is the first economist to be EU Competition Commissioner. In
his June 4, 2002 speech, he indicated that "the Commission does not rely on the fact that
efficiencies resulting from a merger are likely to have the effect of reducing or eliminating
competition in the relevant market (for example, by enabling lower prices to be charged to
customers), as a ground for opposing a proposed transaction .. " Mario Monti, European
Competition Commissioner, Review of the EC Merger Regulation-Roadmap for the Reform
Project Conference on Reform of European Merger Control, British Chamber of Commerce,
at 5 (June 4, 2002), available at http://europa.eu.int/rapid/start/cgi/guesten.ksh?p action.
getfile=gf&doc=SPEECHI02/252101AGED&lg=EN&type=PDF [hereinafter Monti British
Chamber Speech].
119. Monti British Chamber Speech, supra note 118, at 7.
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efficiencies. 2 ° He expressed that an explicit recognition of merger-specific
efficiencies is possible within the mandate of the ECMR' 21 and further
indicated that:
[T]he Commission intends to carefully consider any efficiency claim in
the overall assessment of the merger, and may ultimately decide that,
as a consequence of the efficiencies the merger brings about, the
merger does not create or strengthen a dominant position as a result of
which effective competition would be significantly impeded. 1
22
The draft European Union Merger Guidelines 23 issued in December
2002 similarly indicate that:
The Commission welcomes corporate [reorganizations] ... [and] takes
into account.., the development of technical and economic progress
provided that it is to the consumers' advantage and does not form an
obstacle to competition.
The Commission considers any substantiated efficiency claim in the
overall assessment of the merger. It may decide that, as a consequence
of the efficiencies that the merger brings about, this merger does not
create or strengthen a dominant position as a result of which effective
competition would be significantly impeded. This will be the case
when the Commission is in a position to conclude on the basis of
sufficient evidence that the efficiencies generated by the merger are
likely to enhance the incentive of the merged entity to act pro-
competitively for the benefit of consumers, by counteracting the
effects on competition which the merger might otherwise have. 1
24
The EU Draft Guidelines further require that "the efficiencies have to
be of direct benefit to consumers and ...be merger-specific, substantial,
timely, and verifiable."' 125 It will be interesting to see how the EU will
apply this framework in practice.
120. Mario Monti, Merger Control in the European Union: A Radical Reform, Speech at
the European Commission/IBA Conference on EU Merger Control, (Nov. 7, 2002),
available at http://europa.eu.int/rapid/start/cgi/guesten.ksh?p-action.getfile=gf&doc=
SPEECH/02/545101AGED&lg=EN&type=PDF [hereinafter Monti Speech at European
Commission]. This formulation of the efficiencies defense by Monti is similar to that
contained in the U.S. 1997 Revisions. U.S. Merger Guidelines and U.S. 1997 Revisions,
supra note 75.
121. Monti Speech at European Commission, supra note 120, at 5.
122. Id.
123. Draft Comm'n Notice on the Appraisal of Horizontal Mergers under the Council
Regulation on the Control of Concentrations Between Undertakings, 2002 O.J. (C 331) 18
[hereinafter EU Draft Guidelines].
124. Id. at 28 (footnote omitted).
125. Id.
[Vol. 56
EFFICIENCIES IN MERGER REVIEW
C. Canada
Both the United States and the European Union may find the
treatment of efficiencies in Canada, which has statutorily embraced an
efficiency defense, pertinent to their consideration of efficiencies. This
defense has been subject to extensive litigation and interpretation, twice
before the Canadian Competition Tribunal and twice before the Canadian
Federal Court of Appeal, in the case of Superior Propane, discussed in
detail below.126
1. The Statutory Efficiency Defense
The Canadian Parliament enacted the statutory efficiency defense 127
in 1986 as part of a series of amendments to the Combines Investigation
Act, Canada's then antitrust statute and the predecessor to the current
Competition Act. 128 Theoretically, the defense permits a merger that
prevents or lessens, or is likely to prevent or lessen, competition
substantially in any market in Canada so long as the efficiency gains
resulting from the merger exceed the anticompetitive effects of the merger.
In practice, merging parties may raise the defense, both in the initial
assessment phase before the Canadian Bureau and again, if necessary,
when the Canadian Commissioner has brought an application before the
Tribunal challenging the merger.
The defense requires that efficiency gains be greater than or offset the
anticompetitive effects of any prevention or lessening of competition
resulting from the merger. The Canadian Merger Enforcement Guidelines
("Canadian Merger Guidelines") prescribe two classes of efficiency gains
that will be assessed under the efficiency defense: (1) production
efficiencies and (2) dynamic efficiencies. Production efficiencies "are
generally the focus of the evaluation, because they can be quantifiably
measured, objectively ascertained, and supported by engineering,
accounting, or other data."'29 Further, "dynamic efficiencies[ ] include
gains attained through the optimal introduction of new products, the
development of more efficient productive processes and the improvement
of product quality and service."130
126. Blake, Cassels & Graydon, LLP, with a legal team led by Neil Finkelstein, was
counsel to Superior Propane, Inc. and ICG Propane Inc. in all of the hearings and
proceedings before the Tribunal and the Federal Court of Appeal.
127. CANADIAN MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 71, app. II.
128. Calvin Goldman headed the Canadian Bureau when the efficiency defense
amendment was introduced as part of the Competition Act.
129. CANADIAN MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 71, app. II.
130. Id.
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However, claims of dynamic efficiencies are generally more difficult
to measure, and the weight given to such claims will be qualitative in
nature. 131
The recent case of Superior Propane32 provides the most
comprehensive analysis of the treatment of efficiencies in Canada. This
case, which arose from the merger of two large Canadian propane
companies, makes clear that Canadian competition law will not block
horizontal mergers leading to high-market shares, provided that the
economies of scale and scope and other quantitative efficiencies achieved
as the result of the merger exceed the merger's anticompetitive effects.
After the merger was challenged by the Canadian Commissioner in a
hearing before the Tribunal, the merger parties argued that the merger
would bring about substantial efficiency gains that would far outweigh any
postmerger anticompetitive effects, primarily through the rationalization of
distribution networks, head office functions, and other duplicative
operations. The Tribunal allowed the merger to proceed and rejected the
claim of the Canadian Commissioner that, as a matter of law, a "merger-
to-monopoly" could never be saved by the efficiency defense. 33
Following two separate appeals by the Canadian Commissioner and a
redetermination hearing by the Tribunal, the merger was permitted to
proceed under the principle that efficiency was the paramount objective of
the Canadian Competition Act. In the second appeal, the Federal Court of
Appeal confirmed that the mere existence of a postmerger monopoly was
not in and of itself an "anti-competitive effect" that would provide grounds
to block the merger. 34
2. Signs of Reform in Canada
Notwithstanding the recent decisions in Superior Propane, the
Canadian efficiency defense as it stands is not free from ambiguity in its
application or execution. Nor is there a paucity of debate and suggested
reform from some Canadian legal scholars and economists who have
proposed alternative approaches to the analysis methods established for the
efficiency defense in Superior Propane.' 35
131. Id.
132. Comm'r of Competition v. Superior Propane, Inc, Registry Doc. No. 192b
(Competition Tribunal, 2000), available at http://www.ct-tc.gc.ca/english/cases/
propane/192b.pdf; rev'd in part by [2001] D.L.R.(4th) 130; reh'g granted Registry Doc. No.
238a (Competition Tribunal 2002), available at http://www.ct-tc.gc.ca/english/cases/
propane/0238a.pdf; aff'd by [2003] D.L.R.(4th) 55 (Fed. Ct. App. 2003).
133. Superior Propane, Registry Doc. No. 192b, para. 418.
134. [2003] D.L.R. (4th) at 72.
135. For example, Professors Ross and Winter posit a "qualified total surplus rule,"
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The Canadian Commissioner decided not to appeal the Federal
Court's second decision to the Supreme Court of Canada. Rather, he has
sought legislative reform by supporting draft amendments to Section 96 in
a private member's bill. 3 6 As it is currently drafted, the bill provides in
effect that, in determining whether or not a proposed merger may prevent
or lessen competition substantially, the Tribunal may have regard to
whether the proposed merger is "likely to bring about gains in efficiency
that will provide benefits to consumers, including competitive prices or
product choices, and that would not likely be attained in the absence of the
merger or proposed merger."' 37 Thus, rather than having a "trade-off'
between efficiencies and anticompetitive effects, efficiencies would be
considered as part of the overall competitive assessment of the merger.
In his address to the Standing Committee on Industry, Science and
Technology, reviewing the draft legislation, the Canadian Commissioner
viewed the proposed amendments as consistent with the objective of
promoting and maintaining fair competition that allows consumers to
benefit from lower prices, product choice and quality service, and stated as
follows:
The Bill seeks to ensure that consumers are not left out of the equation
when considering mergers involving efficiency claims. It would also
safeguard competition to the benefit of consumers and the Canadian
economy....
Bill C-249 would limit the application of the efficiency exception to
ensure that consumers benefit from gains in efficiencies. This means
that efficiencies could never be used to save a merger that resulted in
the elimination of competition altogether. 38
under which the total surplus standard would apply except in rare cases where there is a
clear and seriously regressive transfer away from "poor" consumers. Under this rule, the
burden of proof would reside with the competition authority for demonstrating substantial
lessening of competition and to the transaction parties for demonstrating efficiencies. If the
total surplus standard is met, then the burden would shift back to the competition authority
to prove a seriously regressive wealth transfer. See generally Thomas W. Ross & Ralph A.
Winter, The Efficiency Defense in Merger Law: Economic Foundations and Recent
Canadian Developments, Presented at the Competition Law Roundtable (Dec. 13, 2002) (on
file with the Journal ).
136. An Act to Amend the Competition Act, Bill C-249, 2nd Sess., 37th Parl., 2002,
available at http://www.parl.gc.ca/PDF/37/2/parlbus/chambuslhouselbills/private/
c-249_3.pdf. The Bill was read a second time before the Senate in June 2003.
137. Id.
138. Konrad von Finckenstein, Commissioner of Competition, Speaking Notes for the
Standing Committee on Industry, Science and Technology: Bill C-249-An Act to Amend
the Competition Act, (March 31, 2003) at pp. 1,4, available at http://strategis.ic.gc.ca/
pics/ct/ct02543e.pdf.
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On the other hand, many in the Canadian business and legal
community believe that the approach taken by the Canadian Competition
Tribunal in the Superior Propane case properly reflects the intention of the
Canadian Parliament in its objectives of promoting a more cost-effective
and internationally competitive economy in Canada. The fact that gains in
efficiencies which are real and specific to a merger may override certain
anticompetitive effects is consistent with this broader national objective.
D. Comparison of the Treatment of Efficiencies in the United States,
European Union, and Canada
It is clear that the antitrust authorities of the United States, European
Union, and Canada have followed their own legislation and guiding
policies in the treatment of postmerger efficiencies, resulting, at times, in
markedly different approaches and principles. Appendix C provides a table
illustrating the current differences among these three jurisdictions.
V. EFFICIENCIES: UNRESOLVED QUESTIONS AND
POLICIES
Given the integral role of economics in antitrust analysis and the
sentiments of enforcement officials such as Kolasky, it is surprising that (1)
efficiencies continue to be treated with skepticism and hostility, and (2)
fundamental issues regarding how to evaluate and factor efficiencies into
the analysis remain. The balance of this paper focuses on issues raised by
antitrust officials and scholars and offers suggestions as to how these issues
may be resolved.
A. What Efficiencies Should Count?
This section discusses the types of efficiencies that should count in
offsetting concerns about the competitive effects of a transaction. We
recognize that certain categories of efficiencies are easier to verify and
more likely to be substantiated and realized. We do not, however, favor the
outright rejection of other categories of less certain efficiencies merely
because they are less easily verified or occur less frequently. Rather, we
suggest that, as with any other question of fact, the competition authorities
(and, if applicable, the courts) weigh the evidence presented to determine
whether or not to accept the specific efficiencies claimed by the parties in
the specific transaction.
[Vol. 56
EFFICIENCIES IN MERGER REVIEW
1. Merger Specificity
"Acquisitions have a unique potential to transform firms and to
contribute to corporate renewal."' 139 Firms undertake acquisitions when
their management believes it is the most profitable means of enhancing
capacity, developing new knowledge or skills, or entering new product or
geographic arenas. 4 ' The decision to undertake a major acquisition
typically is part of a broader plan to achieve long-term company growth
and reorganization objectives. The FCC and the U.S. 1997 Revisions focus
on this unique potential by incorporating a requirement that the efficiencies
claimed must be merger specific. 1 ' The recently issued EU Draft
Guidelines also require that efficiencies be merger specific.' 4
Naturally, companies will assert that a merger is the most effective
means of implementing their strategies. These assertions may raise
considerable doubt in the minds of the regulators. For example, in
SBC/PacTel, while the FCC noted that the merger would allow the firms to
combine software development, customer service, billing, and collection
systems, it nonetheless labeled these efficiencies "extremely difficult" to
achieve without a merger, without giving reason why.'43 At the same time,
the FCC suggested that joint research and development efforts "might well
be achievable by a joint venture," as could an improved Internet access
business, a video services venture, and a coordination of international
ventures. 1" Further, in Bell Atlantic/NYNEX, the FCC decided that the
firms had failed to prove that the merger was necessary to create an
effective long-distance competitor, to improve NYNEX's service quality,
or to improve the deployment of broadband services. 145
To impose a rigid merger specificity test to transactions has the
potential of hampering a firm from obtaining, as expeditiously as possible,
efficiencies that may be critical to the firm's ability to compete (both
domestically and internationally) and that may promote competition in the
industry. After all, acquisitions are a major means by which firms achieve
efficiencies.
139. PHILIPPE C. HASPESLAGH & DAVID B. JEMISON, MANAGING AcQUisITONS:
CREATING VALUE THROUGH CORPORATE RENEWAL 3 (1991).
140. Paul A. Pautler, Evidence on Mergers and Acquisitions 1-2 (Sept. 25, 2001),
available at http://www.ftc.gov/be/econwork.htm.
141. SBC/PacTel Order, supra note 18, paras. 74-83.
142. EU Draft Guidelines, supra note 123, para. 90.
143. SBC/PacTel Order, supra note 18, para. 74.
144. Id. paras. 74-83.
145. Bell Atlantic/NYNEX Order, supra note 30, para. 168.
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There may be a number of reasons why firms do not pursue
efficiencies internally. For instance, a firm may not want to expand its
infrastructure to take advantage of new technological efficiencies because
the industry already has excess capacity or the associated costs would be
prohibitive. That firm, however, could benefit from substantial efficiencies
by merging with a competitor and consolidating its operations in the
competitor's newer network. Similarly, although it may be theoretically
possible to achieve many of the network effects through interconnection
and the establishment of common standards, firms may not want to enter
into a joint venture or contract due to high transaction costs associated with
allocating the benefits of the arrangement between the firms. This is
particularly true when the operations of the two parties are not perfectly
symmetric, such that there may be competing internal uses for the network
(e.g., cable telephony versus cable programming services on a cable
network).
Various contracting options may not work as effectively as a merger
due to the potential for opportunism that may occur in the context of
agreements for the acquisition or lease of "knowledge." Many of the
benefits of mergers involve the acquisition of knowledge, skills, and
routines (e.g., marketing, customer service, technology, operations, best
practices). Knowledge-based transactions can result in high transaction
costs, as the creation of knowledge "often involves highly specific
investments where quasi-rents could be expropriated in a spot market
setting." '146 There are also difficulties in estimating the value of knowledge
before it is seen. Yet after the knowledge has been disclosed, there is no
need to pay for it. Further, knowledge assets often require continual
investment to improve or maintain their value and may be subject to free-
rider problems when independent companies attempting to "share" a brand
name free-ride on investments of others in developing and maintaining the
value of the brand name. All of these risky transaction costs may preclude
the direct transfer or shared use of knowledge assets, making merger the
preferred solution. In addition, corporate capabilities may be prone to
dynamic transaction costs stemming from the fact that different people (and
firms) possess different mental models based on their individual and
established past experience, routines, and corporate culture. As firms do not
share the same mental models, contracting for capabilities outside the firm
may be more expensive than producing them inside the firm.14 7
The intended achievement of scale economies can also be
discouraged by the requirement for merger specificity. Acquiring firms can
146. Ellig, supra note 5, at 198.
147. Id., at 199-200.
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benefit from higher market share due to economies of scale in production,
distribution, and marketing activities, as well as greater efficiency in future
operating and investment decisions.'48 Simple scale economies may fail
this test if it is strictly interpreted because one or both of the merger parties
might be able to achieve greater scale on its own. 149 This is particularly true
in industries either undergoing significant growth, or declining industries
where excess capacity would exit the market following the transaction.
In our view, competition authorities should not force companies to
choose less desirable means of achieving efficiencies or foregoing
efficiencies because of some theoretical possibility that the firms could
achieve those efficiencies absent a merger. The courts have-at the urging
of the enforcement agencies-been very literal in their treatment of merger
specificity, focusing on whether a firm could achieve the efficiencies
absent the transaction and blocking transactions in which the court found
efficiencies would occur. 5 ' Rather, we submit that the focus should be on
whether there will be incremental cost savings from undertaking a
transaction rather than attempting an internal expansion. Further, merger
parties should not be limited to counting only those efficiencies that will be
achieved over the short term. 151 To the extent a longer time period is
considered, the value of efficiencies can be suitably discounted to account
for any risk and opportunity costs associated with the transactions.
Although, theoretically, some of the efficiency gains of a merger
might be able to be achieved through other means (such as a service
contract or lease), the mere theoretical possibility that such benefits could
be achieved through means other than a merger should not be the
benchmark for determining merger specificity. 152 Indeed, the EU Draft
148. Aloke Ghosh, Increasing Market Share as a Rationale for Corporate Acquisitions 2
(May 2002), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/delivery.cfm/SSRNID314267_
code0261600.pdfabstractid=314267#PaperDownload.
149. Farrell & Shapiro, supra note 45 at 690; see also 4A PHILLIP E. AREEDA ET AL.,
ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION, 49-51
(rev. ed., Aspen 1998).
150. FTC v. Tenet Health Care Corp., 186 F.3d 1045, 1054-55 (8th Cir. 1999); FTC v.
H.J. Heinz, Co., 116 F. Supp. 2d 190, 198-99 (D.D.C. 2000); FTC v. Cardinal Health, Inc.,
12 F. Supp. 2d 34 (D.D.C. 1998); FTC v. Staples, Inc., 970 F. Supp. 1066, 1088-90 (D.D.C.
1997).
151. Some EU commentators, for instance, believe only a two-to-three-year time frame
should be counted. The EU Draft Guidelines indicate that the longer efficiencies are
projected into the future, the less weight the EC will assign to the efficiencies being brought
about, and the benefits will be discounted accordingly. EU Draft Guidelines, supra note
123, para. 94. To date, there is no EU decision on this point.
152. The U.S. 1997 Revisions recognize that "the Agency will not insist upon a less
restrictive alternative that is merely theoretical." U.S. Merger Guidelines and U.S. 1997
Revisions, supra note 75, at 31.
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Guidelines indicate that the EC will concentrate "on realistic and attainable
alternatives rather than merely theoretical ones" and will consider
"established industry practices."' 53 By way of comparison, in a Sherman
Section 1 case, a court typically will not reject the countervailing
justification (e.g., efficiencies) proffered by defendants merely because the
restraint was not the "least restrictive means" of achieving the pro-
competitive objective, provided that undertaking the arrangement to
achieve this objective is deemed "reasonable." '154 In contrast, some argue
that under Clayton Section 7, "[e]fficiencies are not merger-specific if
individual firms likely can and will achieve them without the necessity of
merging (or comparable restrictions)."' 55 This formulation of the test may
be too restrictive if it requires showing that the specific firms at issue could
not and would not have undertaken the efficiency-producing activity absent
the merger. Accordingly, Chairman Muris (correctly, we submit) favors a
test that focuses on whether the efficiencies are likely absent the merger,
rather than on the question of whether the merger is reasonably necessary
to achieve the efficiencies.'56
2. What Constitutes Cognizable Efficiencies?
Not all types of efficiencies are treated equally under the law (or, for
that matter, by economists). Currently, there is an unwarranted bias toward
accepting only those variable production cost savings 57 that can be
achieved in a relatively short time frame. Although there is a greater risk of
not achieving the efficiencies the longer the time horizon considered, such
risk can be accounted for by applying an appropriate discount to the value
attributed to those efficiencies, rather than blindly ignoring their potential
benefits.
This section discusses each of the major categories of efficiencies and
the current views regarding recognition of the category as a benefit, as well
as some possible reasons for broadening the categories of cognizable
efficiencies.
153. EU Draft Guidelines, supra note 123, at 29.
154. See, e.g., United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365, 380-81 (1967)
(examining whether restraint was "reasonably necessary), cited in 2002 A.B.A SEC.
ANTITRUST L., ANTITRUST L. DEV. 76 n.413 (5th ed.).
155. Farrell & Shapiro, supra note 45, at 690.
156. Muris 1999 Article, supra note 77, at 732.
157. The EU Draft Guidelines indicate that cost efficiencies that lead to reductions in
variable or marginal costs are more likely to be relevant than reductions in fixed costs
because they are more likely to result in lower consumer prices. EU Draft Guidelines, supra
note 123, at 29.
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a. Productive Efficiency
Productive efficiency is the least controversial category of
efficiencies. It is readily quantifiable and, for the most part, broadly
accepted by economists and competition authorities alike. However, there
remains some debate as to whether efficiencies should be counted if they
can be achieved internally, such as by expanding facilities internally to
achieve economies of scale. There are a number of practical reasons,
however, why internal expansion can be significantly more costly. First, it
might be slower to occur due to the need to construct facilities, introduce
new technologies, etc. Second, adding new capacity in a stable or declining
demand environment may place downward pressure on price, thereby
making such expansion unprofitable. Third, adding new capacity may
result in social waste to the extent that duplicate resources at the acquired
firm subsequently may be scrapped." 8
b. Distribution and Promotional Efficiencies
The U.S. 1997 Revisions are silent regarding the acceptability of
distribution and promotion efficiencies. (The Canadian Merger Guidelines,
on the other hand, expressly acknowledge the acceptance of efficiencies
relating to distribution and advertising activities. 5 9) While the FTC Global
Staff Report viewed these types of efficiencies as "less likely to be
substantial ... and often likely to be difficult to assess,"16 Chairman Muris
has noted that in the cost structure of consumer goods, promotion plays an
important role, particularly since the larger market share may be needed to
achieve minimum efficient scale.' 6 ' Prior to his appointment as FTC
Chairman, he suggested that the government recognize these kinds of
efficiencies.162 We submit there is no reason that distribution and
promotional efficiencies should not be counted.
c. Dynamic or Innovative Efficiency
While productive efficiencies are achieved from producing goods at
lower cost or of enhanced quality using existing technology, innovative
efficiencies "are the cost saving or product enhancement gains achieved
158. See William J. Kolasky, The Role of Efficiencies in Merger Review, ANTITRUST,
Fall 2001, at 82.
159. Id.
160. FTC Global Report, supra note 74, at 33.
161. J. HOWARD BEALES & TIMOTHY J. MURIS, STATE AND FEDERAL REGULATION OF
NATIONAL ADVERTISING, 7-10 (1993) (recognizing the importance of these economies in
consumer goods markets); Muris 1999 Article, supra note 76, at 734.
162. Muris 1999 Article, supra note 76, at 734.
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from the innovation, development, or diffusion of new technology.' ' 63
Especially in high-tech industries, "much of the focus of efficiency analysis
will be on R&D efficiencies. R&D efficiencies offer great potential, but
because they tend to focus on future products, there may be formidable
problems of proof."'T6 The FTC Global Report acknowledged that
"innovation efficiencies may make a particularly powerful contribution to
competitive dynamics, the national R&D effort, and consumer (and overall)
welfare."' 65
As a general proposition, society benefits from conduct that
encourages innovation to lower costs and develops new and improved
products. Thus, Kolasky indicated in March 2002, "productive and
dynamic efficiencies are at least as important as static allocative efficiency
in promoting economic growth."'166 The European Union appears to
recognize this type of efficiency as well, at least to the extent that it results
in real or improved products that benefit consumers.' 67 Yet, the U.S. 1997
Revisions provide that efficiency claims "relating to research and
development are potentially substantial but are generally less susceptible to
verification and may be the result of anti-competitive output reductions."6'
Just because they are difficult to quantify and verify, however, does not
mean that such efficiencies should be ignored. Dynamic efforts should be
taken into account even though they do not necessarily lead to price
reductions' 69 or their effects are not seen in the short term.
d. Transactional Efficiency
An acquisition can foster transactional efficiency by eliminating the
middle man (and, therefore, "double marginalization"). United States, and
presumably European Union, antitrust law has not always been sensitive to
the role of mergers in reducing these costs. In contrast, Canada has
recognized the benefit of increased production-related efficiency resulting
from integrating activities within the merged entity that were previously
performed by third parties. (Attainment of these gains generally involves a
163. Joseph F. Brodley, Proof of Efficiencies in Mergers and Joint Ventures, 64
ANTITRUST L.J. 575, 579 (1996) (footnote omitted).
164. David Balto, The Efficiency Defense in Merger Review: Progress or Stagnation?,
ANTITRUST, Fall 2001, at 74, 76.
165. FTC Global Report, supra note 74, at 32.
166. William J. Kolasky, Comparative Merger Control Analysis: Six Guiding Principles
for Antitrust Agencies-New and Old, Address at the International Bar Association
Conference on Competition Law and Policy in a Global Context (Mar. 18, 2002), available
at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/10845.htm.
167. EU Draft Guidelines, supra note 123, at 29.
168. U.S. Merger Guidelines and U.S. 1997 Revisions, supra note 75, at 37.
169. Ilzkovitz & Meiklejohn, supra note 6, at 24.
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reduction in transaction costs associated with matters such as contracting
for inputs, distribution, and services. 170)
In general, market participants design business practices, contracts,
and organizational firms to minimize transaction costs and reduce exposure
to opportunistic behavior (e.g., holdups). Joint ventures and common
ownership can help align firms' incentives and discourage shirking, free
riding, and opportunistic behavior that can be costly and difficult to police
using arm's-length transactions. Transactional efficiencies, therefore,
should be recognized as benefits from a merger.
e. Network Efficiencies
Notwithstanding that network effects can create substantial, if not
difficult to quantify, efficiencies, mergers that consolidate consumer
penetration for one of the networks can also create significant entry
barriers. First, once customers select a particular network, any substantial
nonrecoupable investment that the individual consumers make can have a
"lock-in" effect that will deter consumers from switching to a rival system,
even if that system is superior. Second, a significant combined penetration
rate can have a tipping effect, causing certain consumers that have not
already chosen a network to go with the larger entity. Third, the larger
merged firm may alter its willingness to deal with rivals on fair, or any,
terms postmerger due to changed ability and incentives to foreclose others
from access to customers. As a result, network externalities can be seen to
weaken competition by incumbent firms and create entry barriers for new
competitors. 171
A concern about network externalities having an anticompetitive
effect was the prime reason that the DOJ cleared the WorldCom/MCI
transaction only after the parties committed to divest Internet MCI (MCI's
Internet backbone service business) to Cable & Wireless. 72 Prior to the
merger, there were several providers of nationwide Internet backbone
services, with no one company accounting for a majority of the customers
or providing complete network coverage. As a result, the major providers
had agreed to interconnect with peers in order to provide complete network
coverage. In the absence of the divestiture, the merger would have
combined two of the top four Internet backbone service providers, and
170. CANADIAN MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 71, app. II. Indeed, distribution
efficiencies have played significant roles in assessing the overall effects of a merger.
171. Timothy J. Muris, The FTC and the Law of Monopolization, 67 ANTITRUST L.J.
693, 719, 723 (2000).
172. Press Release, DOJ, Justice Department Clears WorldCom/MCI Merger after MCI
Agrees to Sell its Internet Business (July 15, 1998), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/
opa/pr/1998/July/329at.html.
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MCI/WorldCom would arguably no longer have had the same incentive to
interconnect with others to offer backbone services (or could have
degraded interconnection services). 173 In addition, the merged firms'
increased scale and share of the backbone volume (i.e., more than fifty
percent of the current subscribers) might have had a tipping effect, thereby
further increasing the advantages of MCI/WorldCom in attracting
customers and hampering the ability of others to compete.
f Technological and Standardization Efficiencies
As stated above, standardization of technology resulting from the
combination of networks can generate significant social gains. However,
since many merger control laws do not permit the consideration of any
postmerger efficiencies that would occur absent the merger, one must
determine whether the adoption of a common standard would have been
achieved in the absence of the merger. 174
g. Procurement, Management and Capital Cost Savings
The U.S. 1997 Revisions place purchasing, management, and capital
cost savings in the category of efficiencies that "are less likely to be
merger-specific or substantial, or may not be cognizable for other
reasons." '175 Indeed, some commentators have argued that certain types of
cost savings should be accorded greater weight than others, owing to issues
of the difficulty of evidentiary proof. 76 For example, savings arising from
consolidating management or administrative functions are thought to be of
lower value than those that might arise from economies of scale. Former
Canadian Bureau economist Margaret Sanderson observed:
In the Bureau's experience, administrative and corporate overhead
savings are just as likely to be measurable as plant-level production
savings. However, certain production efficiencies are generally more
easily verifiable than others and are certainly easier to verify than
dynamic efficiencies. Yet this has not resulted in according a differing
status to a class of efficiencies in the trade-off analysis; rather, a
probability weighting (or range of weightings) is assigned to the
173. The abandoned MCI WorldCom/Sprint merger also raised the same concerns since
Sprint is a major Internet backbone company. The merger was abandoned after the DOJ
announced an intention to seek a preliminary injunction to block. Complaint, United States
v. WorldCom (D.D.C. 2000) (No. 00-CV-1526), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/
cases/f5000/505 I.pdf.
174. Schwindt & Globerman, supra note 7.
175. U.S. Merger Guidelines and U.S. 1997 Revisions, supra note 75, ch. 4.
176. Margaret Sanderson, Efficiency Analysis in Canadian Merger Cases, Remarks at
the Federal Trade Commission Hearings on Global and Innovation-Based Competition
(Nov. 2, 1995), available at http://www.ftc.gov/opp/global/sandersn.htm.
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various cost claims. In this way the less likely cost savings are
accorded less weight without discarding a class or type of efficiency
claim. 177
The EC also appears to be hostile to this category of savings. In
Aerospatiale-Alenia/de Havilland, for instance, the management cost
savings identified by the parties were rejected as not merger specific:
"These cost savings would not arise as a consequence of the concentration
per se, but are cost savings which could be achieved by de Havilland's
existing owner or by any other potential acquirer."' 78 Nevertheless, we
submit that such cost savings should not be summarily dismissed since in
the real world they do occur and can be significant in magnitude.
i. Procurement Savings
A Booz-Allen & Hamilton report indicated that procurement
synergies often comprise fifty percent of the total value of all synergies
realized in a merger. 79 Not surprisingly, therefore, in the business world,
procurement savings often are a touted source of merger savings, with
"[p]rocurement consistently generat[ing] the bulk of near-term savings in
merger integration efforts."'' 80 For instance, increased volume typically
results in lower unit costs. In addition, combining best practices in sourcing
approaches and purchasing practices can result in significant cost
savings. 181 "Procurement savings are particularly persuasive where the
reduction in the number of buyers or the streamlining of the buying process
will reduce the costs of the suppliers and these reduced costs will be passed
on to consumers."'' 82 It should be noted, however, that the Canadian
Competition Act does not permit efficiency claims that merely represent "a
redistribution of income between two or more persons," including a
redistribution of income to suppliers extracted as reductions through the
increased bargaining leverage of the merged firm.' 83
177. Id.
178. Commission Decision of Oct. 2, 1991 Declaring the Incompatibility with the
Common Market of a Concentration (Case No. IV/M053-Aerospatiale-Alenia/de Havilland)
1991 O.J. (L 334) 42, 59 (emphasis added).
179. DORIAN SWERDLOW ET AL., MANAGING PROCUREMENT THROUGH A MERGER:
CAPTURING THE VALUE OF THE DEAL 2 (Booz-Allen & Hamilton, Viewpoints on Mergers,
Acquisitions, and Intergration, Aug. 2001), available at http://extfile.bah.com/Iivelink/
livelink/87995/?func=doc.Fetch&nodeid=87995.
180. Id. at exec. summary.
181. James P. Andrew & Michael Knapp, Boston Consulting Group, Maximizing Post-
Merger Savings from Purchases (July 1, 2001), available at http://www.bcg.com/
publications/files/MaxPostMSavings-fromPurchApr_.0 I ofa.pdf.
182. Balto, supra note 164, at 77.
183. R.S.C., ch. 19 (2nd Supp.) § 96(3) (1985) (Can.).
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It is ironic that antitrust officials are skeptical regarding obtaining
procurement efficiencies given that, in a few recent U.S. cases, the premise
for the competition concern was the market power that the combined firm
would have in the purchase of a particular input (i.e., monopsony
power).' 4 Rbller, Stennek and Verboven recognize that purchasing cost
savings can be achieved in a merger. They suggest:
To assess the social effects from increased bargaining power toward
suppliers, it is important to know the degree of power at the supplier
side. If there is little power in the supplier side, the increased
bargaining power of the merging firm may be socially harmful. If,
however, the increased bargaining power forms a form of
countervailing power to an already strong supply side, then the private
benefits from the merging firm may coincide with the social
benefits. 185
As reflected in the paucity of government challenges on these
grounds, monopsony power rarely exists, or is sustained, in markets. As
David Balto indicates, "[p]rotecting the ability to secure lower prices is an
important goal of the antitrust laws.. .. '[Courts] should be cautious-
reluctant to condemn too speedily-an arrangement that on its face appears
to bring low price benefits to the consumer."'1 86 Accordingly, absent
monopsony issues, the competition authorities should permit parties to
assert procurement savings as benefits from the transaction.
ii. Managerial Savings
Although antitrust enforcement officials may discount managerial
efficiencies as not being merger specific and being a fixed cost less likely
to be passed on to consumers in the short term, 187 the financial literature
recognizes the importance of the "market for corporate control"
(acquisitions) as a means of weeding out bad management and moving
184. United States v. Aetna, Inc., 1999-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 72,730; United States v.
Cargill, Inc., 2000-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 72,966. See also Susan M. Davies & Marius
Schwartz, Monopsony Concerns in Merger Review, CLAYTON ACT NEWSLETrER (Am. Bar
Ass'n, Section of Antitrust Law), Winter 2002, at 19.
185. LARS-HENDRICK ROLLER ET AL., EFFICIENCY GAINS FROM MERGERS (Research Inst.
of Indus. Econ., Working Paper No. 543, 2000) available at http://ideas.repec.org/p/hhs/
iuiwop/0543.html.
186. Balto, supra note 164, at 78 (quoting Kartell v. Blue Shield, 749 F.2d 922, 931 (1st
Cir. 1984)).
187. Joseph Kattan, Efficiencies and Merger Analysis, 62 ANTITRUST L.J., 513, 520 n.36
(1994).
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assets to their highest valued uses.' 88 FTC Commissioner Thomas Leary
indicates:
Efficiencies of [the kind realized by General Motors], whether they are
called innovation or managerial economies, are probably the most
significant variable in determining whether companies succeed or
fail-or in determining whether certain more specific merger
efficiencies are achieved or not. Yet, we do not overtly take them into
account when deciding merger cases.189
In large public corporations particularly, a failure of management to
maximize the profits of the corporation leads to internal inefficiency,
sometimes referred to as "x-inefficiency." It is the recoupment of some of
these inefficiencies that motivates some transactions, particularly hostile
transactions. It is through resource sharing and the transfer of functional
and general management skills that capability transfer takes place in
acquisitions. 9 ° Functional skill and general management skills transfer
occurs when one firm improves its capabilities by obtaining functional
skills from another firm. Examples include advanced manufacturing
process skills, knowledge of an additional distribution channel, and cutting-
edge research,' 91 as well as corporate leadership and human resource
management. These managerial skills are, perhaps, more transferable
within same or complementary industries than between different product or
service industries. 92 In the right circumstances, for example, when a
merger facilitates the use of superior know-how, such efficiencies should
be recognized. Professor Scherer notes that "[i]t is a fact of life that some
managements are better at reducing costs than others. To ignore
efficiencies that result from superior management is to close one's eyes to
an important component of reality."'' 93
Similarly, in a November 2002 ABA speech, Commissioner Leary
recognized:
[I]nnovation or managerial [efficiencies] ... are probably the most
significant variable in determining whether companies succeed or fail.
188. Michael C. Jensen & Richard S. Ruback, The Market for Corporate Control: The
Scientific Evidence, 11 J. FIN. ECON. 5 (1983).
189. Thomas B. Leary, Efficiencies and Antitrust: A Story of Ongoing Evolution,
Address at the Fall Forum of the ABA Section of Antitrust Law (Nov. 8, 2002), available at
http://www3.ftc.gov/speecheds/leary/efficienciesandantitrust.htm.
190. HASPESLAGH & JEMISON, supra note 139, at 29.
191. Id. at 30-31.
192. See id. at 126. This is in part due to a failure to appreciate and understand the
subtleties of industry and firm context. Further, managerial efficiencies are extremely
difficult to verify, and almost all business executives think they can run the target company
better than the target's current team.
193. F.M. Scherer, Some Principles for Post-Chicago Antitrust Analysis, 52 CASE W.
RES. L. REV. 5, 21 (2001) [hereinafter Scherer Case Western Article].
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. . . Yet, we do not overtly take them into account when deciding
merger cases.
We tend to ignore the less-tangible economies in the formal decision
process because we simply do not know how to weigh them. 194
Indeed, there are no reported instances in which any of the
competition authorities studied expressly recognized managerial
efficiencies in the merger review and permitted the transaction to proceed
on that basis. Commissioner Leary suggests that one solution is to evaluate
the track record of the acquirer and the key employees of the target
company to determine whether they are likely to manage the company
efficiently.195 Commissioner Leary further suggests that even if the staff
cannot quantify the value of such managerial efficiencies, such arguments
should provide the staff with a noncompetitive explanation for the
transaction. 196
iii. Capital Cost Savings
A related category of efficiency disfavored by the antitrust
enforcement agencies relates to capital-raising efficiencies, presumably
because of the relatively fixed nature of these costs. Research reveals
evidence of substantial efficiencies in capital-raising costs as one of the
most persistent advantages of corporate size. Empirical work indicates that
companies with more than $1 billion in assets enjoy, on average, about a
six percent lower borrowing cost than firms with $200 million in assets.
Moreover, $200 million companies enjoy a borrowing cost advantage of
approximately twelve percent over $5 million companies. 197 A more recent
study finds empirically that firms can increase their financial leverage post-
consummation because of an increase in debt capacity, 198 thereby
facilitating quicker expansions. Yet, the U.S. and EU competition
authorities are unwilling to count such savings.
As with productive scale economies, these pecuniary savings should
also be recognized because they can dramatically improve the firm's cost
position and, therefore, its competitiveness in the marketplace. To the
extent that these cost savings are likely to be passed on to consumers only
over the long term and a consumer welfare standard is deployed, the value
of these savings can be discounted appropriately.
194. Leary, supra note 189.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. F.M. SCHERER & DAVID Ross, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC
PERFORMANCE 126 (3rd ed. 1990).
198. Aloke Ghosh and Prem C. Jain, Financial Leverage Changes Associated with
Corporate Mergers, 6 J. CORP. FIN. 377 (2000).
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B. What Welfare Standard Should Be Applied?
The debate continues regarding whether "allocative efficiency" '' or
consumer surplus should be the ultimate goal of competition laws. The
debate over the proper standard is part of the greater political debate over
whether the ultimate goal of antitrust laws is consumer welfare or
efficiency maximization. Nevertheless, it is useful at a minimum to
understand the merits and limitations of the full range of standards-
regardless of whether or not one particular jurisdiction has the political
appetite for adoption of the standard.
1. Price Standard and Consumer Surplus Standard
Under the price standard, proven efficiencies must prevent price
increases in order to reverse the potential harm to consumers. Efficiencies
are considered as a positive factor in merger review, but only to the extent
that at least some of the cost savings are passed on to consumers in the
form of lower prices.
The consumer surplus standard is a refined variation of the price
standard. Under the consumer surplus standard, a merger will be permitted
to proceed where the consumer gains in efficiency (i.e., the resource
savings in costs) exceed the total loss of consumer surplus. However, while
the lost consumer surplus is taken into account, the corresponding profit
gain to seller/shareholders is not and, therefore, does not offset the loss in
consumer surplus. In other words, no benefit is recognized from
seller/shareholder profits, even when society may benefit from such profits.
Advocates of the total surplus standard argue that the consumer
surplus standard is not consistent with traditional welfare theory: by
assigning a zero weight to seller/shareholder profits, the standard, in effect,
disregards the maximization of social welfare, i.e., that gains to
seller/shareholders can be socially positive. By assigning the same weight
to all consumers, the consumer surplus standard treats all consumers alike,
therefore protecting all consumers, even when some may be better off than
the shareholders.
In the United States, courts and the FCC currently favor a form of
consumer surplus standard."' In Canada, at least for the time being, a
balancing weights approach has been adopted. In the European Union, to
the extent efficiencies have been recognized, it has been under this
consumer surplus standard that (otherwise objectionable) transactions have
199. "Allocative efficiency" is sometimes referred to as "total welfare" or "total
surplus."
200. Leary, supra note 189.
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been permitted. Monopoly overcharges, after all, represent a real harm to
consumers. Consumer surplus proponents believe that "[a]llocative
efficiency claims are seldom to be advanced in justification of a merger."201
Under the consumer surplus standard or the price standard, there must be
direct welfare of purchasers in the relevant market count. Any merger that
raises price, without regard to magnitude of any associated savings, reduces
consumer welfare. Thus, under this approach, efficiencies are only
cognizable if passed on to consumers in the form of price reductions.2 °2
One problem with the passing-on requirement is the relationship between
presumed anticompetitive conduct and likely efficiencies.
Apart from whether the goals of antitrust laws should prohibit wealth
transfers from consumers to producers, there appears to be a strong
economic basis for eliminating the passing-on requirement. Former FTC
Chairman Robert Pitofsky indicated that the passing-on requirement is a
"killer qualification" since it requires a nearly perfect competitive market,
in which case, he posits that the transaction would not be a concern in the
first place. 20 3 Accordingly, Pitofsky concludes that the passing-on
requirement "prevent[s] consideration of an efficiency defense in most
cases where it would make a difference. '2 °4 More recently, Commissioner
Leary indicated that he "do[es] not favor any separate requirement that
pass-on of efficiency savings be shown. '2 5 The Canadian Competition
Tribunal reached the same conclusion when it flatly rejected the consumer
surplus standard in the Superior Re-determination Decision because its
adoption in all cases would generally make the efficiency defense
unavailable under the Competition Act.
206
2. Total Surplus Standard
The total surplus standard, like the consumer surplus standard, is
applicable to a merger that may result in both higher prices and lower costs.
As mentioned above, total surplus is the sum of consumer and producer
surplus. Consumer surplus is the difference between what consumers are
201. Mark N. Berry, Efficiencies and Horizontal Mergers: In Search of a Defense, 33
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 515, 544 (1996).
202. Kattan, supra note 187, at 519. Kattan says that this consumer surplus standard,
with its distributional consequences, is supported by legislative history. Id. at 528 n.63.
Most commentators have interpreted the U.S. 1997 revisions as adopting the "consumer
welfare" approach.
203. Robert Pitofsky, Proposals for Revised United States Merger Enforcement in a
Global Economy, 81 GEO. L.J. 195, 207 (1992).
204. Id. at 208.
205. Leary, supra note 189, at 9.
206. Comm'r of Competition v. Superior Propane, Inc., [2001] D.L.R.(4th) 130.
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willing to pay for a product and the amount they are required to pay, and
producer surplus is the difference between a firm's revenues and its
economic costs (i.e., its economic profits). If the result of a merger is to
raise the price of the relevant product without improving quality, consumer
surplus decreases ceteris paribus; if the merger is profitable, producer
surplus increases. Some of the increase in producer surplus arises from the
decrease in consumer surplus. This is called the transfer of wealth or
welfare, as an increase in price causes wealth to be distributed from the
consumer to the producer. Under the total surplus standard, welfare
transfers from consumers to shareholders are not taken into account.
Rather, the anticompetitive effect of the merger is measured solely by the
deadweight loss to society.2 °7 Therefore, under this standard, efficiencies
need only exceed the deadweight loss to permit an otherwise
anticompetitive merger to proceed.
Perhaps the arguments for the total surplus standard are best
summarized by Professor McFetridge:
The consumer surplus standard will allow mergers that hurt consumers
as consumers and forbid mergers that benefit the economy as a whole.
It does not distinguish between the transfer of wealth and the
destruction of wealth. The consumer surplus standard is acknowledged
to have no basis in welfare economics.208
Unlike a consumer surplus approach, a total welfare standard assigns
an equal weight both to the loss in consumer surplus and the corresponding
gain to shareholders. In other words, the transfer of wealth on surplus is
viewed as "neutral. ' '209 The rationale for a total surplus standard is
grounded in the belief that the wealth transfer effects of mergers are neutral
due to "the difficulty of assigning weights to certain effects a priori based
on who is more deserving of a dollar."210 In contrast, under a consumer-
207. Michael Trebilcock & Ralph A. Winter, The State of Efficiencies in Canadian
Merger Policy, CAN. COMP. REC., Winter 1999-2000 at 106, 106.
208. D.G. McFetridge, Efficiencies Standards: Take Your Pick, CAN. COMP. REC.,
Spring/Summer 2002, at 45, 55.
209. Ross and Winter are critical of the neutrality assumption and argue that the fact that
all individuals in the economy consume, and therefore can be labeled consumers, does not
in itself mean that a transfer from one group of individuals to another can be treated as
neutral. Rather, a transfer is "welfare-improving" if it transfers wealth from more wealthy to
less wealthy individuals. A priori, it cannot be said that consumers in a market are of the
same wealth as shareholders. For example, in some markets-ski resorts, airlines, private
jets, spa services, luxury goods in general-consumers are relatively wealthy, whereas in
other markets, consumers may be less wealthy than shareholders. Ross & Winter, supra note
135, at 37-38.
210. Margaret Sanderson, Competition Tribunal's Re-determination Decision in
Superior Propane: Continued Lessons of the Value of the Total Surplus Standard, CAN.
COMP. REC., Spring/Summer 2002, at 1, 1. The difficulty in making these interpersonal
utility comparisons occurs in both a theoretical sense and a practical sense. From a
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oriented approach, the focus is on ensuring that consumers obtain a direct
share of the wealth transfer rather than being indifferent to whether
consumers or shareholders obtain the benefits. It is, of course, theoretically
possible to assign differential weights to consumers and producers, as
employed by the balancing weights approach discussed below.
One factor to consider is whether, even assuming that the total
welfare standard is politically unacceptable generally, there may be reasons
to adopt the standard in certain limited industries, such as
telecommunications. Given the network characteristics that exist in the
industry, it is clear that network externalities arise from the increased usage
of the network. Indeed, the most efficient network might be the monopoly
network. Although the optimal solution might be to permit such
consolidation in exchange for continued regulatory oversight by, for
instance, the FCC, it is unclear whether today's political fora, which have
embraced competition over regulation, would even contemplate such an
arrangement.
3. Balancing Weights Approach
The redistribution of income resulting from a transaction that
increases a firm's market power normally will have a negative effect on
consumers (through loss of consumer surplus) and a corresponding positive
effect on seller/shareholders (through excess profit). The balancing weights
approach attempts to find a balance between these redistributive effects by
assigning relative weights to each of the losses to consumers and gains to
sellers/shareholders. This approach was endorsed by the Canadian Federal
Court of Appeal in Superior Propane and subsequently applied in principle
by the Tribunal.21" '
Whether these two effects offset each other in any capacity is a
socioeconomic decision that requires a value judgment depending on the
individual characteristics of those consumers and shareholders affected by
the merger. 212 In some cases, the redistribution of income may be seen as
theoretical point of view, there is often no basis for valuing one consumer's welfare over
another's welfare. From a practical point of view, it is often difficult to trace the
beneficiaries of increased profits, which are largely pension funds.
211. Comm'r of Competition v. Superior Propane, Inc, Registry Doc. No. 192b
(Competition Tribunal, 2000), available at http://www.ct-tc.gc.ca/englishlcases/propane/
192b.pdf. Prior to Superior Propane, the total surplus standard had been the proper test
since the early 1990s in Canada and had been adopted in the Canadian Merger Guidelines.
212. Id. paras. 431-437. The Canadian Competition Tribunal initially rejected the
balancing weights approach because, inter alia, it considered that the members of the
Tribunal were not qualified to make assessments on the social merit of competing societal
interests. See id. para. 431. Further, the Tribunal was of the view that the adoption of the
balancing weights approach might result in inconsistent decisions based on the individual
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neutral. In other cases, it will be seen as socially positive or socially
negative. The difficulty in this approach, of course, is determining the
appropriate weights to assign to each of these societal groups. It allows for
a degree of subjectivity we believe should be minimized if it is to be a
useful and relatively predictable means of assessment.
C. What Standard of Proof Should Be Imposed?
The expected value of an efficiency is a function of both the
magnitude and the likelihood of the efficiency, and, if a low expected value
is sufficient to outweigh the competitive risks of a transaction, then an
efficiency of lesser magnitude or lower probability, or both, may meet the
merging parties' burden. Part of the skepticism about efficiencies arises
from the difficulties in gauging future events with precision. Conrath and
Widnell capture the suspicion with which evidence of efficiencies is
evaluated:
The information relevant to evaluating claims of efficiencies from
specific mergers is entirely within the control of the merging firms.
They have an incentive to overstate or fabricate information to obtain a
benefit-market power. It is easy to make glib efficiency claims; it is
harder to deliver on them. Perhaps as a result of this phenomenon,
there is, in the authors' experience, rarely a merger that attracts the
attention of an enforcement agency whose proponents do not claim
that their particular merger creates unique efficiencies that will be
passed on to consumers and cannot be achieved without the merger.
The firms and individuals that make overstated, excessively
optimistic, or fanciful efficiencies claims in merger litigation do not
have to live with all the consequences of being wrong about
efficiencies. Suppose that an anticompetitive merger is approved on
the prediction that efficiency price decreases will outweigh
anticompetitive price increases. If the efficiencies claims turn out to be
overstated, and the anticompetitive price increases occur, the net effect
is anticompetitive higher prices....
Firms have other disincentives that discouragje the firm from
overstating efficiency claims.... On balance, however, it is always
appropriate to evaluate efficiency claims with an eye on whether there
is a connection between truth and consequences." 3
(and perhaps subjective) views of the members of the Tribunal. Id. para. 433.
213. Craig W. Conrath & Nicholas A. Widnell, Efficiency Claims in Merger Analysis:
Hostility or Humility, 7 GEO. MASON L. REV. 685, 696-97 (1999). Muris notes that "[t]he
Conrath & Widnell article... illustrates the continued hostility of career government
attorneys. In reading this Article, it is difficult to reject the conclusion that the authors
believe that the Guidelines are just fine-the 1968 Guidelines, that is, which rejected
consideration of efficiencies in most cases." Muris 1999 Article, supra note 76, at 751 n. 132
(citation omitted).
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The credibility of efficiencies claims depends on verification of the
claims and the strength of the evidence overall. The most common sources
of evidence are a company's internal plans and cost studies, as well as
public statements.1 4 To the extent that the motive for a transaction is
achievement of efficiencies, some engineering and financial evaluations
may be available. Depending on the extent of due diligence and the number
of people within each company who are involved in the transaction pre-
announcement, there may be only preliminary and rough estimates of such
cost savings pre-transaction.
Moreover, the lack of detailed documents does not mean that the
transaction parties have not legitimately considered and relied upon the
potential efficiencies in their business decisions regarding the transaction.
FTC Bureau of Economics Director David Scheffman explained:
Economists are generally frustrated by the paucity of company
documents laying out merger efficiencies. This experience has helped
develop agency economists' skepticism about merger efficiencies. It is
unclear, however, whether agency economists recognize that they
would generally find a paucity of company documents dealing with
any major strategic investment decision that would have effects far
into the future. Companies do not generally write reports or analyses in
anything like the form that an economist would create. The business of
business is taking risks, not writing reports.
215
Nevertheless, to the extent that there are internal plans and cost
studies developed by the merger parties, they should be considered by the
antitrust officials, regardless of whether they were compiled before or after
a transaction's announcement.
2 16
In addition, industry studies of size-related cost efficiencies may be
available from third-party consultants or in economics and engineering
literature. Testimony from industry, accounting, and economic experts also
can be useful. Similarly, information regarding past merger experience of
merging firms or other firms in the industry can be useful indicators of the
likely cost savings from the proposed merger.
214. Publicly-traded companies, however, may be conservative regarding their estimates
regarding potential efficiencies due to the potential for the marketplace to punish severely
(through the equity trading value) a company that fails to meet its claims; rather, firms may
be rewarded in the long term if they lowball their claims and then are able to tout
achievements that exceed the target.
215. David T. Scheffman, Making Sense of Mergers, 38 ANTITRUST BULL. 715, 723
(1993).
216. Gary L. Roberts & Steven C. Salop, Efficiencies in Dynamic Merger Analysis,
WORLD COMPETITION L. & ECON. REV., June 1996, at 5, 15. The U.S. antitrust authorities
have tended to be skeptical of documents and studies developed after a transaction is
announced, even though, there may be practical reasons why pre-announcement documents
do not exist or are in a preliminary state. Id.
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Professor Ellig suggests that there are four reasons to be confident
that the efficiencies submitted by telecommunications firms, at least in
FCC proceedings, should be reliable: (1) Because "the materials submitted
are sworn statements under penalty of perjury... it is likely that the claims
at least represent a plausible version of firms' current perceptions of the
mergers' likely effects." (2) "[T]he merging firms face strong incentives to
understate the expected quantum of cost savings and other efficiencies."
These incentives are a product of FCC regulatory proceedings that "give a
variety of parties, including competitors, suppliers, labor unions, business
customers, consumer organizations, and other public interest groups an
opportunity to argue that they should receive some of the gains from the
merger." Merger parties can "reduce their exposure to such demands by
downplaying the size of the efficiencies." (3) "Merging companies
frequently commit to the projected cost savings and revenue enhancements
by announcing them to underwriters and investment analysts and basing
managerial compensation on achievement of the goals." (4) "Several
mergers-notably SBC/PacTel, Bell Atlantic/NYNEX, and an earlier
merger of Bell Atlantic and NYNEX's cellular ventures-have produced
their expected cost savings on schedule."2 7
Although review of the existing evidence may not eliminate all doubt
regarding (1) whether the efficiencies will indeed be achieved and (2) the
magnitude of savings that will actually be realized, this is not a reason to
conclude that the efficiencies should not be counted at all or should be
given less weight than evidence relating to market power. The same
difficulties and uncertainties can be cited when trying to predict any future
eventualities, including the effects of concentration and market power.
Given the societal costs of blocking a transaction that may produce
significant synergies, enforcement officials should not adopt any
presumptions against efficiencies, but rather, they should evaluate the
merits of such claims just as they would weigh the likelihood of
anticompetitive efforts. While it is true that forecasting synergies from a
merger is an uncertain and difficult exercise, this is often no more
speculative than forecasting the competitive response of rivals or poised
entrants to possible price increases by the merged entity. Further, a stricter
evidentiary burden also might negate the availability of the efficiency
exception. Neil Campbell concurs with this argument when he observes
that "[f]uture efficiency gains need not (and usually cannot) be established
conclusively. . . . The same standard is used in the anti-competitive
threshold where it appears to mean probable. There is no reason to assign a
217. Ellig, supra note 5, at 207-08 (citations and footnotes omitted).
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different meaning in the efficiency gains context." 218 The burden of proof
imposed on transaction parties claiming an efficiency defense should be the
same, less than absolute, standard.
D. How Should Efficiencies Be Factored into the Analysis?
Debate remains regarding how efficiencies should be included in
M&A analysis. There appears to be, at least in the United States, an
unwritten "absolute rule" that recognizes efficiencies, for enforcement
purposes only, on a sliding scale as compared to postmerger market
concentration levels. 219 Simply stated, this rule suggests that the lower the
concentration levels, the more likely antitrust agencies will factor into the
analysis the efficiencies' benefits of a transaction. 220 For transactions
raising higher concentration concerns, this approach discounts efficiency
claims. Moreover, as indicated in the U.S. 1997 Revisions and in recent
court decisions, at some point, concentration may reach a level at which
efficiencies almost never count (e.g., monopoly or near monopoly, or, as
proposed by former FTC Chairman Pitofsky, where the combined company
would hold more than thirty-five percent of the market).2 Indeed,
efficiencies have never been the primary reason that the U.S. antitrust
authorities lost a merger challenge.222
Similarly, the use of structural market indicators appears to
correspond to the current EU model, to the extent the European Union has
not explicitly recognized an efficiency defense, but rather takes the
likelihood of efficiencies into account by using a relatively high threshold
for its structural presumptions. 23
The Canadian efficiency defense provides no limits to the level of
concentration that can be authorized thereunder. Without such limits, the
acceptance of a valid efficiency defense theoretically may permit the
creation of a monopoly or near monopoly that eliminates competition
altogether, increases prices for consumers, and effectively obviates or
218. A. NEIL CAMPBELL, MERGER LAW AND PRACTICE: THE REGULATION OF MERGERS
UNDER THE COMPETITION ACT 156 (1997) (footnotes omitted).
219. Pitofsky Remarks, supra note 78.
220. Id. at 218.
221. See, e.g., U.S. Merger Guidelines and U.S. 1997 Revisions, supra note 75, at ch. 4.
222. See Jonathan B. Baker, Efficiencies and High Concentration: Heinz Proposes to
Acquire Beech-Nut (2001) in The Antitrust Revolution: Economics, Competition and Policy
(John E. Kwoka, Jr. and Lawrence J. White, eds., 4th ed. 2004); see also Berry, supra note
201, at 526-28; Conrath & Widnell, supra note 213, at 688-690.
223. Ilzkovitz & Meiklejohn, supra note 6, at 22.
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frustrates the other purposes of antitrust legislation. Indeed, the practical
effect of the Tribunal's decision in Superior Propane was to allow near
monopolies in several Canadian markets where great efficiencies will be
created, at least arguably in the short run (as opportunities for entry were
still available as noted by the Tribunal), notwithstanding the Canadian
Commissioner's argument that "no merger to monopoly could ever, by
definition, bring about gains in efficiency that offset the effects of the
merger on competition. 224
We submit that, rather than using postmerger concentrations as an
absolute test, the focus of M&A analysis should be on a combination of
qualitative and quantitative factors. The imposition of a strict "monopoly"
exception would eliminate this. Moreover, where would such a
"monopoly" exception kick in-at eighty-five percent, eighty-eight
percent, ninety-three percent, or one hundred percent? The result would be
rather arbitrary and suggest a precision that is not realistic, particularly
where there may be questions as to proper product or geographic market
definitions.
Would it therefore be better to discard the presumption based on
concentration in favor of a case-by-case adjudication of other factors such
as market conditions and net efficiencies? There is, after all, an efficiency
in decision making by establishing a rule that is readily administrable rather
than, in each case, undertaking a full-blown review of the competitive
effects (including efficiencies) likely to occur as a result of the merger.225
But how valid is the concentration presumption in the first place? The
presumption that a transaction will likely result in a price increase based on
the concentration levels uniformly set across all industries is viewed by
some scholars as weak, absent extraordinary circumstances of creation or
enhancement of unilateral market power. In other words, the empirical
basis of existing theories for attacking mergers on concentration and
market share grounds alone simply lacks a firm foundation. This is
particularly believed to be true in markets where technological
development is rapid. For instance, under Canadian competition law,
market concentration or market share is only one of the factors considered
in a merger review. In fact, the Canadian Competition Act provides that the
224. Konrad von Finckenstein, Address at Canadian Bar Association
Competition Law Section Annual Meeting, Ottawa (Sept. 30, 1999), available at
http://cb-bc.gc.ca/epic/internet/incb-bc.nsf/vwGeneratedlnterE/ctO1616e.html.
225. C. Frederick Beckner III & Steven C. Salop, Decision Theory and Antitrust Rules,
67 ANTITRUST L.J. 41 (1999).
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Tribunal shall not find that a merger substantially lessens competition
solely on the basis of market share or concentration.226
We submit that, instead of strict conformity with concentration
presumptions, a better analytical approach would be to adopt, as part of the
merger review, the procedures applied by the U.S. courts in a Sherman
Section 1 claim. If the market were very concentrated, a "quick look"
approach could be adopted.227 Under this approach, once the plaintiff or
government authority established a prima facie case of illegality (based on
market shares, entry barriers, prior conduct, etc.), the burden then would
shift to the defendants to produce evidence supporting an efficiency claim.
Rarely would it be the case in the merger context that the rule of reason
could be applied and dismissed "in the twinkling of an eye. 2 28 So long as
the defendants were able to show some evidence of legitimate efficiencies
claims, a full-blown rule-of-reason analysis would be undertaken to
determine the relevant market's competitive dynamics and the likely
competitive effects if the efficiencies were to occur. At the rule-of-reason
stage, no presumptions of illegality would be asserted on the basis of
concentration; rather, a balancing of the likelihood of anticompetitive
effects against the potential for efficiency gains would be employed. The
standard of proof should be based on the balance of probabilities for both
sides of the balancing process.
VI. CONCLUSION
The role of efficiencies in merger review is still evolving, with the
current environment in at least the European Union, and to some extent the
United States, still more hostile than would appear to be optimal. In
Canada, a more amicable view toward efficiency exists, but there remains
considerable controversy regarding how to achieve the right balance and
even if the efficiency defense will be maintained in its current form. In the
following discussion, we attempt to summarize some of the outstanding
issues, as well as possible avenues for reform.
First, some of the common issues associated with estimating reliably
the cost savings and other benefits resulting from a merger may be
exacerbated when the merging parties operate in a more complex network
environment such as telecommunications. For example, network
efficiencies must be carefully balanced against the potential for near-
226. The Competition Act, R.S.C., ch. C-34, § 92(2) (1985) (Can.).
227. See NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85 (1984); See also Cal. Dental Ass'n v.
FTC, 526 U.S. 756 (1999).
228. NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 109-10, n.39 (quoting PETER AREEDA, THE
"RULE OF REASON" IN ANTITRUST ANALYSIS 37-38 (1981)).
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dominant networks to tip the market in their favor. Further economies of
scale and scope in the telecommunications industry differ from those which
are clearly understood in traditional manufacturing industries.
Second, the regulatory filter, deployed by competition authorities,
regarding which efficiencies should count, may be unduly fine and
limiting, especially when considering some of the complex and unique
efficiencies generated in telecom M&A. While productive efficiencies are
likely to be recognized, other categories of efficiencies are likely to be
viewed with more skepticism or rejected outright. Dynamic or R&D
efficiencies can be paramount in telecommunications M&A, yet some
competition authorities find them too difficult to predict, quantify, and
verify, and therefore discount or reject them. Efficiencies from distribution
and promotion, as well as efficiencies from transactional, procurement, and
capital cost savings may be given less weight or be rejected,
notwithstanding the fact that transactions are designed and entered into on
the expectation that such efficiencies will be attained, and in many
transactions, they are actually realized. There is a clear need for greater
receptivity and understanding by competition authorities of all efficiencies
and their underlying rationale (as well as the expected benefits to
consumers, whether short or long term), combined with review on a case-
by-case basis of the likelihood of achieving such efficiencies.
Third, what standard should be applied in determining whether, on
balance, the efficiencies will justify the transaction? Currently, in the
United States and European Union, the entire analysis is colored by the
consumer surplus standard under which postmerger prices must fall or a
direct benefit must flow through to consumers. While a total surplus
approach finds considerable support among a number of economic experts,
a balancing weights approach may be a reasonable compromise solution
that balances the interests of both consumers and suppliers and permits
competition authorities to take a more global and protracted view towards
efficiencies that would, over the long term, benefit society as a whole.
However, effort should be made to reduce the subjectivity and increase the
predictability of this method.
Finally, in our view, it would be a mistake for each jurisdiction to
proceed in a vacuum in developing divergent efficiency policies. It is
essential to the continued evolution of the global marketplace that
efficiencies be promoted and reviewed uniformly by competition
authorities and the FCC, and that efficiency policies be consistent across
jurisdictions. The adoption and evolution of a broader and more universally
consistent efficiency defense will increasingly require antitrust authorities
to develop an expertise in calculating efficiencies and their effects,
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including determining what efficiencies should be included in a tradeoff
against postmerger anticompetitive effects, establishing how such
efficiencies should be quantified and deciding how they should be weighed
against the perceived loss to consumer surplus once they are quantified.
Evidence to support the foregoing analyses is sometimes readily
ascertainable but may also be varied and not necessarily attainable with
ease. However, these analyses can be performed with the benefit of proper
accounting and economic expertise. Competition authorities therefore need
not shy away from such issues because of complexity or perceived
uncertainty.
The challenge is even greater in the context of transborder merger
cases, which is increasingly the situation in the global telecommunications
industry. With practice and development of the appropriate expertise,229
these and other challenges arising from the consideration of efficiencies
should become more manageable. The analytical work relating to
efficiencies must continue if we are to see M&A reviews conducted in a
balanced and sensible manner that does not incorrectly impose political
values in order to block potentially beneficial transactions out of an
abundance of caution nor permit transactions to proceed that result in
rampant and prolonged monopoly rent seeking by the merged firm. Such
judgments require an enlightened and unbiased careful examination of the
entire record rather than reactions premised upon faulty or unsupported
political or economic assumptions. It is only through a continued dialogue
among competition authorities, economists, lawyers, and business
executives that a more appropriate role for efficiencies can emerge in our
increasingly global M&A environment.
229. Scherer Case Western Article, supra note 193, at 22 ("To do the job right, ... [the
agencies] will have to seek new kinds of expertise--e.g., the kind possessed by high-priced
management consulting firms.").
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Appendix A
Partial List of Telecom/Media Mergers 1996-2003
Primary Amount Antitrust
Date Companies Jurisdiction US$B Review 230
2003 Hughes Electronic Corp.- US 6.6 In progress
New Corp. Ltd.
2002 Granada plc--Carlton Europe (UK) 2 In progress
Communications plc
2002 EchoStar-Direct TV US 25 F
2002 Rainbow Media Group- US 1 C
Cablevision Systems Corp.
2002 Univision-Hispanic US 34 C
Broadcasting Corp.
2002 Sonera Oyj-Telia AB Europe 9 C
2001 Global Crossing - Citizens US 3.5 C
2001 Comcast - AT&T US 72 C
Broadband
2001 BCE Inc. - CTV Canada 1.7 C
2000 Deutsche Telekom - US/Europe 53 C
VoiceStream
2000 Vivendi - Seagram US/Europe/ 40 C
Can
2000 Telefonica - KPN Europe N/A F
2000 France Telecom - Orange Europe 46 C
2000 AOL - Time Warner US 160 C
2000 TELUS - Cleamet Canada 4.4 C
1999 Vodafone - Mannesmann Europe 180 C
1999 Mannesmann - Orange Europe 34 C
1999 Telia - Telenor Europe 47 F
1999 MCI Worldcom - Sprint US 129 F
1999 Vodafone AirTouch - Bell US 70 C
Atlantic GTE
1999 Viacom - CBS US 35 C
1999 Qwest - US West US 35 C
1999 Olivetti -Telecom Italia Europe 33 C
1999 Vodafone - AirTouch US/Europe 74.7 C
1999 AT&T- MediaOne US 56 C
230. C: merger cleared, F: merger forbidden.
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Primary Amount Antitrust
Date Companies Jurisdiction US$B Review230
1998 Call-Net - Fonorola Canada 1.2 C
1998 Bell Atlantic - GTE US 52.8 C
1998 AT&T - TCI US 48.3 C
1998 SBC - Ameritech US 62 C
1998 Alltel - Aliant US 1.5 C
1998 AT&T - IBM's Global US/Europe 5 C
Network Operations
1998 AOL - Netscape US 4 C
1998 Teleglobe Excel Canada 7 C
Communications
1998 AT&T - Vanguard Cellular US 1.7 C
1998 Northern Telecom - Bay US 9 C
Networks
1998 SBC- SNET US 4.4 C
1998 Alltel - 360 Degrees US 6 C
1997 WorldCom - MCI US 40 C
1996 Bell Atlantic - Nynex US 25.6 C
Source: Le Blanc & Shelanski, supra note 1, in part.
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Appendix B
Telecommunications Companies Experiencing Bankruptcy or
Other Financial Difficulties
Company Sector
UNITED STATES
Adelphia Communications CLEC and Cable Company
Global Crossing
Covad Commmunications CLEC and Cable Company
McLeodUSA CLEC and Cable Company
NorthPoint CLEC and Cable Company
Rhythms NetConnections CLEC and Cable Company
Adelphia Business Solutions CLEC/DLEC and Cable Providers
Broadband Office CLEC/DLEC and Cable Providers
Covard Communications CLEC/DLEC and Cable Providers
CTC Communications CLEC/DLEC and Cable Providers
e.spire CLEC/DLEC and Cable Providers
FastComm CLEC/DLEC and Cable Providers
ICG Communications CLEC/DLEC and Cable Providers
ITC DeltaCom CLEC/DLEC and Cable Providers
Knology CLEC/DLEC and Cable Providers
Metromedia Fiber Network CLEC/DLEC and Cable Providers
Mpower CLEC/DLEC and Cable Providers
Network Plus CLEC/DLEC and Cable Providers
OnSite Access CLEC/DLEC and Cable Providers
YIPES Communications CLEC/DLEC and Cable Providers
Zephion CLEC/DLEC and Cable Providers
Ardent Communications ISP
colo.com ISP
Excite@Home ISP
Exodus ISP
IBeam ISP
NetRail ISP
PSINet ISP
360networks Long-haul and Fiber Network Wholesaler
Aleron Long-haul and Fiber Network Wholesaler
Cambrian Communications Long-haul and Fiber Network Wholesaler
Number 1]
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Company Sector
Digital Teleport Long-haul and Fiber Network Wholesaler
Enron Broadband Long-haul and Fiber Network Wholesaler
GST Long-haul and Fiber Network Wholesaler
Iaxis Long-haul and Fiber Network Wholesaler
KPNQwest Long-haul and Fiber Network Wholesaler
Neon Communications Long-haul and Fiber Network Wholesaler
Sigma Networks Long-haul and Fiber Network Wholesaler
Sphera Long-haul and Fiber Network Wholesaler
Telergy Long-haul and Fiber Network Wholesaler
Velocita Long-haul and Fiber Network Wholesaler
Viatel Long-haul and Fiber Network Wholesaler
Williams Communications Long-haul and Fiber Network Wholesaler
Global Crossing
WorldCom Long-haul and Fiber Network Wholesaler
WINfirst Long-haul and Fiber Network Wholesaler &
CLEC/DLEC and Cable Providers
Advanced Radio Telecom Wireless/Satellite Provider
Globalstar Wireless/Satellite Provider
Iridium Wireless/Satellite Provider
Metricom/Ricochet Wireless/Satellite Provider
Motient Wireless/Satellite Provider
Nextwave Telecom Wireless/Satellite Provider
OmniSky Wireless/Satellite Provider
StarBand Wireless/Satellite Provider
Teligent Wireless/Satellite Provider
WinStar Wireless/Satellite Provider
EUROPE
Deutsche Telekom AG International and Local Carrier
NTL CLEC/DLEC and Cable Providers
Song Networks CLEC/DLEC and Cable Providers
Carrier 1 Long-haul and Fiber Network Wholesaler
Ebone/GTS Long-haul and Fiber Network Wholesaler
FLAG Telecom Long-haul and Fiber Network Wholesaler
Pangea Long-haul and Fiber Network Wholesaler
Storm Telecommunications Long-haul and Fiber Network Wholesaler
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Company Sector
Viatel Long-haul and Fiber Network Wholesaler
CANADA
AT&T Canada Long Distance Provider
Microcell PCS Wireless Provider
Sprint Canada Long Distance Provider
Teleglobe International Carrier
GT Group Telecom Carrier
Axxent CLEC
Optel CLEC
LATIN AMERICA
Impsat Long-haul and Fiber Network Wholesaler
XO Communications CLEC/DLEC and Cable Providers
INDIA
Convergent Communications CLEC/DLEC and Cable Companies
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Appendix C
Comparison of the Treatment of Efficiencies
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UNITED STATES EU CANADA
No separate statutory Still some debate Statutory efficiency
efficiency defense; whether there is an defense
Efficiency gains efficiencies defense or
considered as part of total offense
assessment
Efficiency gains must show Efficiency gains not yet Efficiency gains must
that transaction is not explicitly recognized as be "greater than and
likely to be anticompetitive a basis to permit an offset" anticompetitive
otherwise effects
anticompetitive
transaction
Efficiency gains in one No explicit precedent Efficiency gains must
market may be weighed permitting offset be greater than and
against anticompetitive offset the aggregate
effects in another market as anticompetitive effects
a matter of prosecutorial
discretion
Efficiencies must be Efficiencies must be Efficiencies must be
merger-specific merger-specific merger-specific
Efficiency is a goal of U.S. "Technical and economic Efficiencies are
antitrust law; however, the progress" among paramount in Canadian
ultimate goal is consumer principles listed in the competition policy
welfare Treaty and ECMR
Consumer surplus standard Consumer surplus Balancing weights
or modified price standard standard approach
or price standard
Efficiencies almost never Efficiencies unlikely to Efficiencies may trump
justify a merger to trump the creation or a merger to monopoly
monopoly or near- strengthening of a or near-monopoly
monopoly dominant position
"Extraordinary"
efficiencies required where
there are high market
concentration levels
Number 1] EFFICIENCIES IN MERGER REVIEW
UNITED STATES EU I CANADA
Uncertain whether
efficiencies should be
passed on in lower prices
to consumers
D.C. Circuit Court was
silent on what are
"extraordinary"
efficiencies
Must be to the benefit of
consumers
No clear methodology
for how loss to
consumer surplus
should be balanced
against gains to
sellers/shareholders
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